

Usability and Security of Out-Of-Band Channels in Secure Device Pairing Protocols

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Concurrency Verification and Security Seminar

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Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 HISPs — Proposed OOB Methods
- 3 Experimental Design
- 4 Results
- 5 Analysis and Discussion
- 6 Conclusion

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Introduction - Device Pairing Scenario



Introduction - Device Pairing

Human-Interactive Security Protocols (HISPs)

(Nguyen and Roscoe, 2006)


- 1 $\forall A \longrightarrow_N \forall A' : A, INFO_A, longhash(A, k_A)$
- 2 $\forall A \longrightarrow_N \forall A' : k_A$
- 3 $\forall A \longrightarrow_E \forall A' :$ users compare $Digest(k^*, INFOS)$
where k^* is the XOR of all the k'_A s for $A \in G$

Introduction - Device Pairing

Human-Interactive Security Protocols (HISPs)

(Nguyen and Roscoe, 2006)

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Introduction - HISPs

Security in HISPs

Technical security

- Security based on formal proofs
- Relates to the size of the digest/fingerprint— 2^b bits for most protocols

Introduction - HISPs

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Technical security

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Effective security

- Secure systems are socio-technical (Sasse et al.)
- Security of a protocol may depend on human effort
- Humans forget, make mistakes
- These mistakes may result in security failures
- Human failures are not covered by formal proofs
- Increasing technical security (value of b) may reduce effective security

Introduction - Research Question

- Are proposed OOB methods usably secure to guarantee specified technical security?

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HISPs - Proposed OOB Methods

Manual comparison


- Devices generate fingerprints
- Fingerprints displayed in appropriate format
- Users compare fingerprints and indicate on the device a match or lack of it
- Devices require display and some form of input method



HISPs - Proposed OOB Methods

Manual copying and entering

- One device displays a fingerprint
- User copies and types the fingerprint into one or more devices
- Requires display and keypad
- Efficiency of entry depends on affordances of devices involved



HISPs - Proposed OOB Methods

Auxiliary devices

- Rely on secondary devices to transfer/compare information
- Proposed devices include
 - camera phone
 - external storage devices
 - data cable etc
- May require users to carry extra hardware



HISPs - Proposed OOB Methods

Short-range wireless channels

- Rely on short range wireless channels
- Require devices to be no more than a few centimetres apart
- Proposed methods include:
 - infra-red
 - light
 - distance bounding¹
- Most methods lack human verification



¹can also use normal channel

HISPs - Proposed OOB Methods

Timing methods

- Rely on transmission of information in well timed intervals
- Users coordinate the synchronisation
- Examples include
 - shaking devices (Saxena et al.)
 - pressing a button in response to some stimulus

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Experimental Design - Methods

DEFINITIONS

Method

- refers to a specific mode of comparing/transferring information between devices by humans

Representation

- refers to specific format in which information is presented to users

Method-representation

- refers to a combination of a method and representation

Experimental Design - Method-representations

Compare & confirm

- Numeric
- Alphanumeric
- Words
- Sentences
- Country names
- Numeric & Sound
- Alphanumeric & Sound
- Melodies
- Images



Experimental Design - Method-representations

Compare & select

- Numeric
- Alphanumeric

Copy & enter

- Numeric
- Alphanumeric

Barcode

Experimental Design - Design

- A repeated measure design was used

Dependent variables

- 1 Time
- 2 Number of non-security failures
- 3 Number of security failures

Independent variable

- 1 Method-representation

Experimental Design - Participants

- 30 participants were recruited via online advertisement

Gender	Male: 47% Female: 53%
Age	18 - 25 40% 26 - 35 27% 36 - 45 13% 46 - 55 3% 56 - 65 13% 66 - 75 4%
Education	High School: 27% College: 27% Graduate: 26% Postgraduate: 20%

Experimental Design - Apparatus

- Devices: Nokia N95 and N73
 - Nokia devices are common
 - Bluetooth enabled
- Software:
 - P2P payment system
 - Device communication using Bluetooth
 - Software created a log of participant's actions
- Digital voice recorder
 - To record interviews
- Questionnaires
 - Enrolment
 - After scenario (AS)
 - After experiment/exit (AE)
- Written instructions



Experimental Design - Procedure

- Before study
 - Participants were sent an enrolment questionnaire
 - Sent brief description of the study and consent form
 - A day and time for the experiment was then agreed
- During study
 - Participants were presented with instructions on how to run the P2P
 - Participants thereafter followed instructions from the devices
 - The goal was to carry out a successful electronic money transaction
 - After each scenario, AS questionnaire was completed
 - After the experiment, AE questionnaire was completed and a short interview conducted

Experimental Design - Procedure: Tasks




Figure: Step 1

Experimental Design - Procedure: Tasks




Figure: Step 2

Experimental Design—Procedure: Tasks

The figure displays two sequential screens from a mobile application. The first screen, titled 'Choose payment type:', features a list of payment methods: VISA, SOLO, and MasterCard. The second screen, titled 'Payment -PIN', prompts the user to 'Enter 4-digit PIN:' and shows a numeric keypad with the digits 1, 2, 3, and 4 entered. Both screens have a status bar at the top with signal strength, battery level, and a clock showing 12:3. An 'OK' button is visible at the bottom right of each screen.

Figure: Step 3 and 4

Experimental Design - Procedure: Tasks




Figure: Step 5 and 6


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Results - Compare & confirm: Errors and completion times

	Time (s)	Security failures	Non-security failures
	Mean	%	%
Numeric	6	0	3.3
Alphanumeric	6	13.3	16.7
Words	7	3.3	16.7
Images	8	0	3.3
Country/ City names	9	0	3.3
Sentences	11	0	16.7
Alphanumeric & sound	12	3.3	20
Numeric & sound	14	3.3	0
Melodies	24	6.7	36.7

Between-subjects: $p = 0.0007$

Within-subjects - time: $p =$ 

Results - Compare & select: Errors and completion times

	Time	Security failures	Non-security failures
	Seconds	%	%
Numeric	9	10	10
Alphanumeric	9	20	30

Between-subjects: $p = 0.0000$

Within-subjects - time: $p = 0.9255$

Results - Copy & enter: Errors and completion times

	Time	Non-security failures
	Seconds	%
Numeric	17	13
Alphanumeric	40	23


Between-subjects: $p = .7531$

Within-subjects - time: $p = .0004$


Results - Barcode: Errors and completion times

Time Seconds	Non-security failures %
37	53


Results - ASQ scores



Results - Preferences



(a) Difficult




(b) Easy

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
Analysis and Discussion – SUM Score Ranking



Analysis and Discussion – Ranking by Security Failures

	Subject to SF	SF	SUM Score
Numeric(CE)	No	0	69
Alphanumeric(CE)	No	0	60.4
Barcode	No	0	53
Numeric(CC)	Yes	0	73.7
Sentences(CC)	Yes	0	62.9
Countries(CC)	Yes	0	59.1
Images(CC)	Yes	0	54.3
Words(CC)	Yes	3.3	70.6
Numeric & sound	Yes	3.3	69.2
Alphanumeric & sound	Yes	3.3	65.8
Melodies(CC)	Yes	6.7	40.7
Numeric(CS)	Yes	10	68.3
Alphanumeric(CC)	Yes	13.3	72.5
Alphanumeric(CS)	Yes	20	64.2

Discussion and Discussion – Security Vs Usability trade-off



Analysis and Discussion – Security Vs Usability trade-off


	Subject to SF	SF	SUM Score
Numeric(CE) ⁵	No	0	69
Alphanumeric(CE)	No	0	60.4
Barcode	No	0	53
Numeric(CC) ¹	Yes	0	73.7
Sentences(CC)	Yes	0	62.9
Countries(CC)	Yes	0	59.1
Images(CC)	Yes	0	54.3
Words(CC) ³	Yes	3.3	70.6
Numeric & sound ⁴	Yes	3.3	69.2
Alphanumeric & sound	Yes	3.3	65.8
Melodies(CC)	Yes	6.7	40.7
Numeric(CS)	Yes	10	68.3
Alphanumeric(CC) ²	Yes	13.3	72.5
Alphanumeric(CS)	Yes	20	64.2

Discussion – Security Vs Usability Considerations

- User conditioning

Discussion – Security Vs Usability Considerations

Example



- (Schechter et al.)

Discussion – Security Vs Usability Considerations

- User conditioning
- User Motivation

Discussion – Security Vs Usability Considerations

- User conditioning
- User Motivation
- Security failures

Discussion – Security Vs Usability Considerations

- User conditioning
- User Motivation
- Security failures
- Attentiveness

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Conclusion

- Traditional methods are favoured by users
- Currently proposed methods need rethinking about their security/usability
- Security failures are not acceptable
- To achieve human compliance, enforcement is required
- Copy & enter is the best compromise
- There is a gap between formal proofs (technical security) and effective security

THANK YOU

Conclusion

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