

Secure and Usable Out-Of-Band Channels for *Ad hoc* Mobile Device Interactions

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
Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 HISP
- 3 OOB Channels
- 4 Problem definition
- 5 Proposed methods
- 6 Security and usability study
- 7 Conclusion

Ad hoc mobile device interactions



Human-Interactive Security Protocols (HISP)



Human-Interactive Security Protocols (HISP)

- ① $\forall A \longrightarrow_N \forall A' : A, INFO_A, longhash(A, k_A)$
- ② $\forall A \longrightarrow_N \forall A' : k_A$
- ③ $\forall A \longrightarrow_{OOB} \forall A' : \text{users compare } Digest(k^*, INFOs)$
where k^* is the XOR of all the k'_A s for $A \in G^1$

- Security is 2^b
- Increasing b cost usability

¹Roscoe et al. 2007

Existing OOB methods

Manual comparison


- Devices generate fingerprints
- Fingerprints displayed in appropriate format
- Users compare fingerprints and indicate on the device a match or lack of it
- Devices require display and some form of input method
- Security failures



Existing OOB methods

Manual copying and entering

- One device displays a fingerprint
- User copies and types the fingerprint into one or more devices
- Requires display and keypad
- Efficiency of entry depends on affordances of devices involved
- Scalability, usability



Existing OOB methods

Auxiliary devices

- Rely on secondary devices to transfer/compare information
- Proposed devices include
 - camera phone
 - external storage devices
 - data cable etc
- May require users to carry extra hardware
- Uniform interfaces, usability



Existing OOB Methods

Timing methods

- Rely on specialised hardware
- Proposed devices include
 - Shaking devices
 - Pressing buttons
- Scalability, usability



Existing OOB methods

Short range directed channels

- Rely on wireless transmission technologies
- Proposed methods include
 - Infra-red
 - Light
- May require specialised hardware
- Security, scalability



Problems with current OOB Channels

- Context specific
- Requirement for specialised hardware
- Security and usability
- Scalability



Proposed OOB — *Word-matching and number-typing*


- Locally stored dictionary
 - proposed two 1024 word dictionaries
 - Phonetically distant
 - less than 40kb file
- Display and button
- Scalable, usable, secure



Proposed OOB — *Word-matching and number-typing*


Potential problems

- Prediction failures
- Word collisions
- Similar sounding words
- Scalable, usable, secure



Proposed OOB — *Repeated numeric comparison*

- Similar to *manual comparison*
- Not subject to security failures
- Display and button
- Correct response is 2^n



Summary of usability study results

- No statistical significance between the two methods in completion times (12.7 and 13.4s mean) ($t(55) = .53$, $p = .598$)
- Ease-of-use: 93% for WMNT, 89% RC
- Preferences: 57% WMNT, 25%RC
- Ratings: no statistical significance ($Z = -0.275$ and $p(2\text{-tailed}) = .78$)
- 13.4s for RC compared to 16.4s reported by Uzun *et al.* for *compare and confirm*
- 12.7s for WMNT compared to 13s reported by Uzun *et al.* for *copy and enter*
- Both methods ranked higher than *compare and confirm* and *copy and enter*

Applications of proposed methods

- Close/distant devices
- Input/output constrained devices
- Group scenarios
- Larger fingerprints



Conclusion

- Security and usability should both be embedded in OOB channels
- OOB methods are either secure or usable. Neither are they scalable
- *word-matching and number-typing* and *repeated numeric comparison* achieve all three
- Applicable to a range of scenarios that other methods may not



THANK YOU