623seq1.spl 1 INITIATOR 1 RESPONDER : one attack found


AuthenticateINITIATORAliceToRESPONDERAgreement_na [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERAgreement_na(Alice))
{true}


AuthenticateINITIATORBobToRESPONDERAgreement_na [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERAgreement_na(Bob))
{true}


AuthenticateRESPONDERAliceToINITIATORAgreement_nb [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateRESPONDERToINITIATORAgreement_na(Alice))

signal.Commit2.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Alice.Na

Alice believes she has completed a run of the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Alice, using data items Na

env.Alice.(Env0,Alice)
signal.Running1.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Alice.Na
intercept.Alice.Alice.(Msg1,Sq.<Na,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Alice,Alice),Na,Alice>)>)
fake.Alice.Alice.(Msg2,Sq.<Na,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Alice,Alice),Na,Alice>)>)
signal.Commit2.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Alice.Na

0.         ->  Alice  : Alice
  Alice believes she is running the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Alice, using data items Na
1.  Alice  -> I_Alice : Na, f(Shared(Alice, Alice), Na, Alice)
2. I_Alice ->  Alice  : Na, f(Shared(Alice, Alice), Na, Alice)
  Alice believes she has completed a run of the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Alice, using data items Na


AuthenticateRESPONDERBobToINITIATORAgreement_nb [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateRESPONDERToINITIATORAgreement_na(Bob))
{true}



623seq2.spl - 1 INITIATOR 1 RESPONDER (Non-self authenticated)
: no attacks found


AuthenticateINITIATORAliceToRESPONDERAgreement_na [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERAgreement_na(Alice))
{true}


AuthenticateINITIATORBobToRESPONDERAgreement_na [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERAgreement_na(Bob))
{true}


AuthenticateRESPONDERAliceToINITIATORAgreement_nb [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateRESPONDERToINITIATORAgreement_na(Alice))
{true}


AuthenticateRESPONDERBobToINITIATORAgreement_nb [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateRESPONDERToINITIATORAgreement_na(Bob))
{true}


623seq3.spl - 2 INITIATORS 1 RESPONDER (Non-self authenticated)
: one attack found


AuthenticateINITIATORAliceToRESPONDERAgreement_na [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERAgreement_na(Alice))
{true}


AuthenticateINITIATORBobToRESPONDERAgreement_na [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERAgreement_na(Bob))
{true}


AuthenticateRESPONDERAliceToINITIATORAgreement_nb [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateRESPONDERToINITIATORAgreement_na(Alice))
{true}


AuthenticateRESPONDERBobToINITIATORAgreement_nb [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateRESPONDERToINITIATORAgreement_na(Bob))

signal.Running2.RESPONDER_role.Bob.Alice.Nb
signal.Commit2.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Bob.Nb
signal.Commit2.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Bob.Nb

Bob believes he is running the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Alice, using data items Nb
  Alice believes she has completed a run of the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Bob, using data items Nb
  Alice believes she has completed a run of the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Bob, using data items Nb

env.Alice.(Env0,Bob)
signal.Running1.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Bob.Na2
comm.Alice.Bob.(Msg1,Sq.<Na2,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Alice,Bob),Na2,Bob>)>)
signal.Running2.RESPONDER_role.Bob.Alice.Nb
comm.Bob.Alice.(Msg2,Sq.<Nb,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Alice,Bob),Nb,Alice>)>)
signal.Commit2.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Bob.Nb
env.Alice.(Env0,Bob)
signal.Running1.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Bob.Na1
intercept.Alice.Bob.(Msg1,Sq.<Na1,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Alice,Bob),Na1,Bob>)>)
fake.Bob.Alice.(Msg2,Sq.<Nb,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Alice,Bob),Nb,Alice>)>)
signal.Commit2.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Bob.Nb

0.       -> Alice : Bob
  Alice believes she is running the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Bob, using data items Na2
1. Alice ->  Bob  : Na2, f(Shared(Alice, Bob), Na2, Bob)
  Bob believes he is running the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Alice, using data items Nb
2.  Bob  -> Alice : Nb, f(Shared(Alice, Bob), Nb, Alice)
  Alice believes she has completed a run of the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Bob, using data items Nb
0.       -> Alice : Bob
  Alice believes she is running the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Bob, using data items Na1
1. Alice -> I_Bob : Na1, f(Shared(Alice, Bob), Na1, Bob)
2. I_Bob -> Alice : Nb, f(Shared(Alice, Bob), Nb, Alice)
  Alice believes she has completed a run of the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Bob, using data items Nb



623seq4.spl - 1 INITIATOR 2 RESPONDERS (Alice acts as both initiator and 
repsonder, non-self authenticated) : one attack found


AuthenticateINITIATORAliceToRESPONDERAgreement_na [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERAgreement_na(Alice))
{true}


AuthenticateINITIATORBobToRESPONDERAgreement_na [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateINITIATORToRESPONDERAgreement_na(Bob))

signal.Commit1.RESPONDER_role.Alice.Bob.Nb2

Alice believes she has completed a run of the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Bob, using data items Nb2

env.Alice.(Env0,Bob)
signal.Running1.INITIATOR_role.Alice.Bob.Na
comm.Alice.Bob.(Msg1,Sq.<Na,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Bob,Alice),Na,Bob>)>)
signal.Running2.RESPONDER_role.Bob.Alice.Nb2
intercept.Bob.Alice.(Msg2,Sq.<Nb2,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Bob,Alice),Nb2,Alice>)>)
fake.Bob.Alice.(Msg1,Sq.<Nb2,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Bob,Alice),Nb2,Alice>)>)
signal.Running2.RESPONDER_role.Alice.Bob.Nb1
intercept.Alice.Bob.(Msg2,Sq.<Nb1,Hash.(f,<Shared_.(Bob,Alice),Nb1,Bob>)>)
signal.Commit1.RESPONDER_role.Alice.Bob.Nb2

0.       ->  Alice  : Bob
  Alice believes she is running the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Bob, using data items Na
1. Alice ->   Bob   : Na, f(Shared(Bob, Alice), Na, Bob)
  Bob believes he is running the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Alice, using data items Nb2
2.  Bob  -> I_Alice : Nb2, f(Shared(Bob, Alice), Nb2, Alice)
1. I_Bob ->  Alice  : Nb2, f(Shared(Bob, Alice), Nb2, Alice)
  Alice believes she is running the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Bob, using data items Nb1
2. Alice ->  I_Bob  : Nb1, f(Shared(Bob, Alice), Nb1, Bob)
  Alice believes she has completed a run of the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Bob, using data items Nb2


AuthenticateRESPONDERAliceToINITIATORAgreement_nb [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateRESPONDERToINITIATORAgreement_na(Alice))
{true}


AuthenticateRESPONDERBobToINITIATORAgreement_nb [T= SYSTEM\diff(Sigma,AlphaAuthenticateRESPONDERToINITIATORAgreement_na(Bob))
{true}





