This website exists to support demonstrations of a family of protocols a developed at Oxford University Computer Science Department.
Please note that much of the technology discussed and demonstrated on this site is the subject of international patent applications. Please contact ISIS innovation for details.
The protocols demonstrated here were devised by Bill Roscoe,
Long Nguyen and Bangdao Chen, based on the
HCBK (2005) and SHCBK (2006) protocols introduced in the paper
Authentication protocols based on low?bandwidth unspoofable channels: a comparative survey by
Roscoe and Nguyen. They are examples of projects 2931 and 3044 on
the web site of ISIS Innovation,
the company responsible for licensing Oxford University IP.
The following is a list of videos of implemented demos (we suggest that you read the section FAQ after watching the videos)
:
Payment at a small shop
This video gives a general overview of the potential risks of paying at a small shop using your cards. We suggest cards and other payment account related data should be read or accessed on the user's own mobile device.
Online payment at home
This video gives a general overview of the inconvenience when we make online payments at home. Our technology enables more convenient and secure payment by using our own mobile devices.
Peer to peer payment between two mobile phones
The payment method
illustrated here is
by mobile banking. The protocol allows secure acquisition of the
payee's bank account details
and other information to help secure the transaction.
On-line payment
The paying telephone does not interact with the
user's computer at all. The only function of that computer in the
protocol is to display the digest value on the https
ecommerce site.
Low-power implementation of secure payment
This video illustrates the same protocol as in video 2. However in
this case the customer's
device is based on a cheap 8-bit processor, illustrating the
efficiency of our method.
Secure network
This video shows how SHCBK can bootstrap a secure
network amongst a group of devices (here 3). This security can then be exploited by
sending messages between
the participants.
