Analytical location holding between non-physical endurants and abstract regions.
The part relation between a particular and an atom.
A boundary here is taken to be a part (mereological treatment). Consequently, in the case of endurants, (reified) boundaries are features.
Anytime x is present, x has participant y. In other words, all parts of x have a same participant.Participation can be constant (in all parts of the perdurant, e.g. in 'the car is running'), or temporary (in only some parts, e.g. in 'I'm electing the president').
A location relation bounded to regions and defined analytically through the composition of inherence and q-location. This is the analytical version of 'generic location'.
'Constituent' should depend on some layering of the ontology. For example, scientific granularities or ontological 'strata' are typical layerings. A constituent is a part belonging to a lower layer. Since layering is actually a partition of the ontology, constituents are not properly classified as parts, although this kinship can be intuitive for common sense. Example of specific constant constituents are the entities constituting a setting (a situation), whilethe entities constituting a collection are examples of generic constant constituents.
The dependence on an individual of a given type at some time. This is traditionally a relation between particulars and universals, but this one states that x generically depends on y if a z different from y, but with the same properties, can be equivalently its depend-on.This is a temporally-indexed relation (embedded in this syntax).
The most generic location relation, probably equivalent to more than one image schema in a cognitive system (e.g. containment for exact location, proximity for approximate location).This is meant to reason on generalized, common sense as well as formal locations, including naive localization, between any kinds of entities. Generic location is branched into 'exact' location, ranging on regions, and 'approximate' (naive) location, ranging on non-regions.
A quality having a q-location at an atomic region.
The immediate relation holding for features and entities.
Any pair of individuals are ontologically identical if they are identical to themselves. Reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
Any pair of individuals are notionally identical iff they instantiate all and only the same concepts.
A relation that holds without additional mediating individuals. In logical terms, a non-composed relation.
A relation that holds without additional mediating individuals. In logical terms, a non-composed relation.
The immediate relation holding for qualities and entities.
Total constant participation applied to the mereological sum of the perdurants in which an endurant participates.
A relation that composes other relations. For example, a participation relation composed with a representation relation.Composed relation cannot be directly expressed in OWL-DL, then (at least some) compositions are expressed as class or restriction axioms.
A relation that composes other relations. For example, a participation relation composed with a representation relation. Composed relation cannot be directly expressed in OWL-DL, then (at least some) compositions are expressed as class or restriction axioms.
Having the same parts at time t.
Mereological overlap: having a common part.
The most generic part relation, reflexive, asymmetric, and transitive.
The immediate relation holding between endurants and perdurants (e.g. in 'the car is running').Participation can be constant (in all parts of the perdurant, e.g. in 'the car is running'), or temporary (in only some parts, e.g. in 'I'm electing the president').A 'functional' participant is specialized for those forms of participation that depend on the nature of participants, processes, or on the intentionality of agentive participants. Traditional 'thematic role' should be mapped to functional participation.For relations holding between participants in a same perdurant, see the co-participates relation.
A composed (mediated) relation used here to make relations 'temporary': by adding it as a superrelation, the effect is that the two related endurants cannot be present at all the same time intervals, but are compresent at least at some time interval (see related axiom).In FOL, the same constraint can be stated directly by coreference.This workaround can be used to index time of relations that involve reciprocal dependency, but it cannot be used in general with relations involving multiple strata of reality. For example, _about_ relation can be temporally indexed, without involving that the time of the information object overlaps with the time of the entity the information is about (but this works for e.g. the _realizes_ relation between information objects and entities whatsoever). The different temporal constraints of about vs. expresses probably derive from the dependency of aboutness from conception (to be about x, an information object should also express a description d that is satisfied by a situation including x, then temporal overlapping of _about_ is true in virtue of d). On the other hand, even conceives cannot be indexed in this way, because overlapping does not hold between the time og the conceiving agent, and the conceived description (or situation).
Analytical location holding between physical endurants and physical regions.
The proper part relation: irreflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
The immediate relation holding for qualities and regions. See 'generic location' branching for the various mediated relations that embed q-location.
Presence of a physical quality when inheres in an endurant.
A relation for representing regions within other regions, e.g. in measurement spaces (space composition).The result of r-location composition is a new 'composed region', which can either preserve the same region type (e.g. physical+physical->physical, or physical+abstract->physical), or not (e.g. physical+abstract->abstract). See 'composition description' for more details.In some cases, space composition is conventional, i.e. a space is just 'located' at another space, as in the case of measurement spaces:(direct composition): r r-location r1In other cases, r-location implies a complex path, e.g. :(homogeneous composition): r q-location-of q inherent-in x has-quality q1 q-location r1(heterogeneous composition across endurants and perdurants): r q-location-of q inherent-in e participant-in p has-quality q1 q-location r1(heterogeneous composition across physical and non-physical endurants): r q-location-of q inherent-in pe specific-constant-dependent npe has-quality q1 q-location r1
Mereological sibling: having a common whole
'Constituent' should depend on some layering of the ontology. For example, scientific granularities or ontological 'strata' are typical layerings. A constituent is a part belonging to a lower layer. Since layering is actually a partition of the ontology, constituents are not properly classified as parts, although this kinship can be intuitive for common sense. Example of specific constant constituents are the entities constituting a setting (a situation), whilethe entities constituting a collection are examples of generic constant constituents.
The constant dependence between two individuals. Taken here as primitive.
By strong connection here we mean a connection between two entities that share a boundary.
The immediate relation holding for qualities and entities at time t.
Having an atom as part at a time t.
Being part at time t. It holds for endurants only. This is important to model parts that can change or be lost over time without affecting the identity of the whole. In FOL, this is expressed as a ternary relation, but in DLs we only can reason with binary relations, then only the necessary axiom of compresence is represented here.
Only some parts of the perdurant p have a participant e.In fact, participation can be constant (in all parts of the perdurant, e.g. in 'the car is running'), or temporary (in only some parts, e.g. in 'I'm electing the president').Implicitly, this relation has a temporal indexing.If needed, in OWL one can derive such indexing by expliciting what parts of p have e as _constant_ participant.An appropriate OWL axiom is created to bind this relation to a proper part of it, which has the temporary-participant as a constant one.
x participates in some of y's parts.
Being proper part at time t. It holds for endurants only. This is important to model proper parts that can change or be lost over time without affecting the identity of the whole.
The perdurant p has a participant e that constantly participates in p with all its parts, e.g. in 'I played the concert' (where the concert is a solo concert).
The perdurant p has a participant e that temporarily participates in p with all its parts, e.g. in 'I played the concert' (where I actually played just an ouverture).See also 'temporary-participant'.
The basic connection, not requiring a common boundary.
The relation between information objects and entities they are about. The difference with 'expresses' is that the last requires a situation to be about something. E.g. Dante's Comedy is about facts like Dante's travel to the hereafter. The Comedy expresses a script as well as various related meanings, while the facts talked about are not 'expressed'.Given that descriptions are expressed by at least one IO, and that interpretations of IOs requires conceiving a description, and the (plausible) claim that being about something can only be done in context, i.e. within a situation, we can propose that the conceived description is satisfied by the situation (the context) of the entity the IO is about.On this basis, about would result to be a mediated relation. This is still a proposal, then we keep about here as a primitive for some time.
Figures are not dependent on roles defined or used in the same descriptions they are defined or used, but they can act because they depute some powers to some of those roles. In other words, a figure selected by some agentive role can play that role because there are other roles in the descriptions that define or use the figure. Those roles select endurants that result to act for the figure.For example, an employee acts for an organization that deputes the role (e.g. turner) that classifies the employee. Simply put, a guy working as a turner at FIAT acts for (or on behalf of) FIAT.In complex figures, like organizations or societies, a total agency is possible when an endurant plays a delegate, or representative role of the figure.
The composition of d-uses and valued-by relations: a description d-uses a parameter that is valued by a region.
An important relation between agents and descriptions is adoption, requiring previous creation by a rational agent, and internal representation by the same agent. It can involve an actual desire to perform the possibly expected actions.
An important relation between agents and descriptions is adoption, requiring previous creation by a rational agent, and internal representation by the same agent. It can involve an actual desire to perform the possibly expected actions.
It is the immediate relation between roles or figures, and tasks. It is the descriptive counterpart of the 'participant-in' relation for agentive roles or figures.In other words, it is used to state attitudes, attention or even subjection that an object can have wrt an action or process. Formally, a modality target is a task that sequences a perdurant that has a participant that plays a role bound to that modality target with a certain modality.For example, a person is usually obliged to drive in a way that prevents hurting other persons. Or a person can have the right to express her ideas.Another, more complex example: a BDI application to a certain ordered set of tasks including initial conditions (beliefs), final conditions (desires), and ways to reach goals (intentions). In other words, to move from beliefs to goals is a way of bounding one or more agent(s) to a sequence of actions.
C-SAT - like R-SAT - concerns entities that exist in a situation entirely prior to the description. Moreover, it assumes redundant satisfaction. But, differently from P-SAT and R-SAT, no qualified satisfaction is assumed. In fact, C-SAT implies no dependency of a situation on its description. C-SAT typically applies to different views of existing situations, as for regulative descriptions (disclaimer: the situation can be already created by complying to the regulation, e.g executing it as a plan, but in this case there actually exists a plan that has the regulation as part), narratives, symbolic interpretations, etc.
A role r characterizes a collection c when proper subsets of the members of c play different roles r,...,rn that are all used by a same description or deputed by a same figure.
A.K.A. 'selected-by'.The referencing relation between concepts defined by descriptions and constituents of situations. It can be understood as a reification of a 'satisfiability' relation holding between elements of theories and elements of models.It has a time index, but this should not be intended as a partial compresence, since the time only refers to a part of the classified particular life or extension.
A.K.A. 'selects'.The referencing relation between concepts defined by descriptions, and constituents of situations. It can be understood as a reification of a 'satisfiability' relation holding between elements of theories and elements of models.It has a time index, but this should not be intended as a partial compresence, since the time only refers to a part of the classified particular life or extension.
A relation holding between two endurants participating in a same perdurant. This typically subsumes many common sense, verbally encoded, relations, such as "making", "moving", "transforming", etc.
'Component' is a proper part with a role (or function) in a system or a context. Roles can be different for the same entity, and the evaluation of them changes according to the kind of entity. For instance, components of endurants can 'play functional roles' in a whole, while components of perdurants are the essential 'episodes' in their whole.As a functional part relation, component is not transitive, because functions depend on intentions and/or designs, and something intentionally essential for a direct whole, can be non-essential for another, indirect whole.
The role shared by all members of a collection has a covering relation towards the collection.
An important relation between agents and descriptions is creation, implying that a given description is *specifically* dependent on a rational agent.
An important relation between agents and descriptions is creation, implying that a given description is *specifically* dependent on a rational agent.
Descriptions can d-use (descriptively use) concepts or figures, provided that used ones are defined by some description.
Descriptions define either concepts or (social) figures. Once defined, they can be d-used by other descriptions.
Figures can depute roles that are played by endurants that are supposed to 'act for' the figure.
Anti-transitive predecessor.
Anti-transitive succession.
A relation between a role and a power allowed towards some function/task.This is dispositional, and implies that a participation classified by this relation is an 'empowered participation'.
A partial order relation that holds between descriptions. It represents the proper part relation between a description and another description featuring the same properties of the former, with at least an additional one.Descriptions can be expanded either by adding other descriptions as parts, or by refining concepts or figures that are d-used by them.Specializing the concepts or figures that are d-used by them is on the contrary a case of description specialization.For descriptions, an intention to expand must be present (unless purely formal theories are considered, but even in this case a criterion of relevance is usually active).
A double composition is needed here for linking situations and descriptions components, since many possible constituents could be available in the situation. The first one constrains the classifies relation through description components, the second one constrains it through situation constituents.
The composition of d-uses and sequences relations: a description d-uses a course that sequences a perdurant.
A method can exploit an involved endurant when it plays a device-like role.
A relation between information objects that are used as representations (signs) and the content (meaning, conceptualization) they represent. In this ontology content is reified as a 'description'.Information objects are 'systemic' objects created by the system of rules of a semiotic code. For the representation between the physical implementation of information objects (physical representations) and information objects, the 'realized-by' relation is used.
Two or more collections can be extensionally equivalent and still not be the same collection. Each collection needs a unifying description which provides its intensional identity criterion.
A description can provide its unity criterion to a physical object. In this case we say that the description *functionally unifies* the physical object. This relation is equivalent to a composition of a description that unifies a collection whose members are (usually connected) proper parts of a physical object.Ideally, this notion should be used to provide a definition to physical objects, but this application would destroy the distinction between a 'perceived' object (an endurant whose unity depends on the perception competence of an agent), and a 'functional' object, since each perceived object would be such because it is functionally unified by a description conceived by the perceiving agent. In DOLCE we still apply to the distinction between perception and function.
When there is an 'epistemological layering', i.e. a description d involves another description d' (one of the roles in d classifies d'), a situation that satisfies d', will be in the scope of d as well.For example, a judgment procedure will have a legal case in its scope, but being a legal case depends on satisfying some legal description not identical to that procedure.Another example: a plan assessment is a technique to evaluate a plan execute, and the assessment 'has in scope' the plan execution.
An activity expected by a method.
A particular has a figure as (one of) its hypostases, e.g. a personification like the holy grail or a goddess.
A figure is an hypostasis of a particular, e.g. a personification like the holy grail or a goddess, or an organization, which is the hypostatis of a (postulated) collective).
The maximal specialization achievable according to some criterion. Only applicable to social objects that logically reify set-related entities (relations, classes, sets).
The relation between descriptions and agents. Agents have inner (a.k.a. 'mental') states and are endowed with, or produce, representations or conceptualizations, both corresponding here to 'descriptions'. The relation has a time index, but this should not be intended as a partial compresence, since time only refers to the part of the agent's life in which it represents the description (a.k.a. 'conceives', now rejected because of its strong human-rationality connotation). Provisionally, internally-represents is introduced here as an immediate (primitive) relation, but other options are under study. The first involves mediating internal representation through an ontology of mental states and events, while the second is semiotic: since descriptions are expressed by at least one information object, representing internally requires at least one creation/interpretation of an information object, therefore internally-represents would be a 'mediated' relation.
The relation between agents and descriptions. Agents have inner (a.k.a. 'mental') states and are endowed with, or produce, representations or conceptualizations, both corresponding here to 'descriptions'. The relation has a time index, but this should not be intended as a partial compresence, since time only refers to the part of the agent's life in which it represents the description (a.k.a. 'conceives', now rejected because of its strong human-rationality connotation). Provisionally, internally-represents is introduced here as an immediate (primitive) relation, but other options are under study. The first involves mediating internal representation through an ontology of mental states and events, while the second is semiotic: since descriptions are expressed by at least one information object, representing internally requires at least one creation/interpretation of an information object, therefore internally-represents would be a 'mediated' relation.
The relation between agents and information objects. In order to interpret something, an agent should conceive a description that results to be 'expressed by' that information object.Interprets implies that an expressed description is conceived by the agent (i.e., when an agent interprets an IO, it conceives of a description expressed by the IO; of course two agents can conceive of different descriptions, then resulting in different interpretations).
The composition of d-uses and played-by relations: a description d-uses a role that is played by an endurant.
A particular case of an endurant participating in a perdurant that meets (is connected to the beginning of) the life of another endurant.
Being a (generic, temporary) constituent in a countable collection, for example: member of a society, bacterium in a colony, etc.
An endurant of type e1 metaphorically plays a role (defined in a description d2), when that role comes from a metaphorical mapping between the description d1 that grants a unity criterion to endurants of type e1, and another description d2 that grants a unity criterion to endurants of type e2.
The relation between roles and courses. Modal target subrelations can be seen as 'reifications' of the operators of modal logics.
A relation between a role and a duty binding towards some function/task.This is dispositional, and implies that a participation classified by this relation is a 'due participation'.
A task (as any other concept) can be optional within some plan (or any description). In this case, it can be ignored in plan execution without affecting the satisfaction of the plan.Within plans, an task said to be optional should be placed in a way that preserves the topology (the connectedness) of the maximal task, except for sequential tasks, where it can be skipped without affecting the control structure. In fact, an optional task must either be component of a bag or sequential task, or have the concurrent task or the any-order task as a direct predecessor.
a.k.a. 'expressed according to'. The relation between information objects and the languages, codes, grammars, etc. that they are ordered by. E.g. Dante's Comedy is ordered by Middle Age Italian language (in this case, a complex of encoding systems).In principle, any description can be used as an encoding system, but in practice, only some combinatorial systems are used for encoding (see module on 'information objects').
P-SAT assumes two satisfaction semantics: redundant satisfaction and qualified satisfaction. In order to allow for a correct implementation of the qualified satisfaction, P-SAT requires that the description exists prior to at least some of the entities in the setting of the satisfying situation. Ontologically, it results that P-SAT also implies a specific dependency of the situation on its description. P-SAT typically applies to plans, projects, designs, methods, techniques, game rules, instructions, punishment rules, constitutive descriptions, sanctions, and strategies.A sample P-SAT qualified satisfaction axiom for plans is given in OWL.
The mediated relation between an entity and a parameter through the region at which the entity is localized and that is the value for the parameter.
This is the immediate relation between roles and endurants. A role classifies the position (function, use, relevance, ...) of an endurant within a context (description). Roles can be ordered, interdependent, at different layers. etc.
This is the immediate relation between roles and endurants. A role classifies the position (function, use, relevance, ...) of an endurant within a context (description). Roles can be ordered, interdependent, at different layers. etc.
To be understood as 'entity x has predecessor y'.This is the transitive version, but it results to be a complex property in OWL-DL, and transitivity should be overruled.
R-SAT assumes redundant satisfaction and qualified satisfaction, but it works out that semantics with entities in the situation that entirely exist prior to the description.This seems paradoxical, since a description hardly motivates what happens if it is not present to any agent involved in things happening. For this reason, we postulate a so-called specific retroactive dependency (SRD), meaning that the creator of the description is willing to attribute the status of a scientific law to that description, despite it could not be present before the situation. R-SAT typically applies to explanations that are considered as well-founded in science (physical, social, or cognitive), reverse engineering, criminal investigation, etc. Consider that the actual validity of the explanation is not addressed by the description, but by external evaluation descriptions.
a.k.a. support.A (usually physical) representation (p. endurant, p. perdurant, p. quality, p. region, or p. situation) realizes a non-physical object according to a system of rules.The main use of this relation is between information objects and the entities through which information objects are used and interpreted. E.g. a paper copy of the 1861 edition of Dante's Comedy, with Dore's illustrations, realizes the Comedy (as an information object).There is a sense in which any entity that realizes an IO also realizes an IO about itself.For example, a painting realizing information about a woman also realizes information about its own information. Of course, the converse of the previous axiom does not hold in general.For example, the information about a woman can be realized by entities different from that woman (as when referring to an absent woman). In other words, an entity (in a semiotic perspective) always realizes two information objects: one about itself, and another about something else.In the non-representation cases, the information objects are identical (an entity only realizes information about itself).Therefore entities, once they have a relevance in a society, can have semiotic properties. Even physical artifacts that are not built primarily for communicative purposes e.g. a chair can be considered as realizing some IO that expresses a design description (cf. system-design), and is about a context (situation) of use, fruition, or just affordance that satisfies the design.
A relation holding between non-physical objects and entities whatsoever (thus including non-physical objects themselves). An intuition for the references relation could be that a non-physical object adds 'information' to an entity. In fact, non-physical objects depend on a communication setting. In most cases, this is the characteristic relation that provides a unity criterion to objects, events, etc. For example, cars are objects and not mere aggregates because there is a project, a design, a social value, a functional structure, a personal emotional structure, etc. attached to them. This attachment can be represented by means of 'non-physical objects' that 'reference' cars. The most obvious application is for situations, which do not exist without a description, although they still are extensional entities: a situation without a part is no more the same situation, but a situation is not a mere aggregate, since it has references to a description as its unity criterion. Adding information to an entity can also be thought as an intentional solution to a holistic stance. Defenders of this view -within different frameworks- are Kant, Brentano, Husserl, Gestalt psychologists, Merleau-Ponty ... References is distinguished according to the kinds of non-physical objects and referenced ground entities: referencing between descriptions and situations is called 'SATISFIED-BY', while referencing between description components and situation components is called 'CLASSIFIES'. 'SETTING-FOR' is a referencing relation between a situation and the entities in its setting (it was formerly a constitution relation, but since situation appear to be social objects from the DOLCE viewpoint, the constitution solution is no more applicable). 'EXPRESSES' is bound to information objects and the meaning (description of a representation or conceptualization) in which they are involved. 'REALIZED-BY' is bound to information objects and physical representations that are used to communicate them, etc. 'ABOUT' is bound to information objects and entities whatsoever (aboutness of intentionality).
A relation holding between non-physical objects and entities whatsoever (thus including non-physical objects themselves). An intuition for the references relation could be that a non-physical object adds 'information' to an entity. In fact, non-physical objects depend on a communication setting. In most cases, this is the characteristic relation that provides a unity criterion to objects, events, etc. For example, cars are objects and not mere aggregates because there is a project, a design, a social value, a functional structure, a personal emotional structure, etc. attached to them. This attachment can be represented by means of 'non-physical objects' that 'reference' cars. The most obvious application is for situations, which do not exist without a description, although they still are extensional entities: a situation without a part is no more the same situation, but a situation is not a mere aggregate, since it has references to a description as its unity criterion. Adding information to an entity can also be thought as an intentional solution to a holistic stance. Defenders of this view -within different frameworks- are Kant, Brentano, Husserl, Gestalt psychologists, Merleau-Ponty ... References is distinguished according to the kinds of non-physical objects and referenced ground entities: referencing between descriptions and situations is called 'SATISFIED-BY', while referencing between description components and situation components is called 'CLASSIFIES'. 'SETTING-FOR' is a referencing relation between situation and the entities in its setting (it was formerly a constitution relation, but since situation appear to be social objects from the DOLCE viewpoint, the constitution solution is no more applicable). 'EXPRESSES' is bound to information objects and the meaning (description of a representation or conceptualization) in which they are involved. 'REALIZED-BY' is bound to information objects and physical representations that are used to communicate them, etc. 'ABOUT' is bound to information objects and entities whatsoever (aboutness of intentionality).
Concepts and figures can be refined by adding components, e.g. an elementary task can become complex, a complex task can increase its complexity, maximal tasks can be composed, etc.A description gets expanded if one of the concepts or figures it uses are refined.Refinement applies also to collections, situations, and information objects.Descriptions are refined by adding component descriptions.
A regulation states reified conditions on how a situation should look like. Regulations are mostly taken as descriptions for the social world.
Requisites are constraints over the attributes of entities. Within DnS, a requisite-for relation holds between parameters (that bound regions to certain value ranges), and either roles, figures or courses. When a situation satisfies a description with parameters, endurants and perdurants in the situation must have attributes that range within the boundaries stated by parameters (in DOLCE terms, entities must have qualities that are mapped to certain value ranges of regions).
Requisites are constraints over the attributes of entities. Within DnS, a requisite-for relation holds between parameters (that bound regions to certain value ranges), and either roles, figures or courses. When a situation satisfies a description with parameters, endurants and perdurants in the situation must have attributes that range within the boundaries stated by parameters (in DOLCE terms, entities must have qualities that are mapped to certain value ranges of regions).
A relation between a role and a right allowance towards some function/task.This is dispositional, and implies that a participation classified by this relation is a 'righteous participation'.
See also comment on 'satisfies' for a different explanation.This is the primitive relation between descriptions and situations. It can be understood as a reification of the 'satisfiability' relation of formal semantics that holds between theories and models. A theory is reified as a description, thus acquiring a life-cycle: a theory can be changed, versioned, discussed, issued, etc. 'Theory' can be a 'potential' theory in the sense that most conceptualizations that could be formalized, could also be reified, e.g. plans, norms, stories, projects, diagnoses, methods, etc. No position is taken on the extensionality of descriptions. For example, if a theory is required to be reified in fine detail, if it changes an axiom, it could be considered no more the same theory. On the other hand, if theories are reified without such a strong assumption, some axioms can be changed just like non-essential parts of physical objects, with the theory preserving its identity.In case a theory is considered extensional, it might be considered a member of a class of 'theory changing history'. The 'refines' relation provides this possibility.A model is reified as a situation, thus a *class* of models that can satisfy a theory is reified as a situation type (class). Situations can depend on descriptions, but not vice-versa (constructivist stance). Components of descriptions 'classify' entities of situations.There are at least three satisfaction subrelations, and a lot of conditions can be stated for allowing an automatic matching of satisfaction. See the FOL version of DLP for details.
See 'satisfied-by'.
This is the immediate relation between courses and perdurants. A course can be either atomic, being a simple 'perdurant role', or it can be complex, thus creating an abstract ordering over a temporal or causal sequence of processes or actions. The ontology of plans develops in detail intentional complex courses.
The relation between a situation and the entities that are referenced by it. (At least some of, or all) such entities must be classified by concepts defined by the description that the situation is supposed to satisfy.
Specialization as reification of a partial-order relation between type- or set-reified social objects, i.e. descriptions, concepts, and collections.For example, concepts that are apparently classified by other concepts; e.g. a manager that plays the role of buyer, where the role manager actually specializes the role buyer. Descriptions can be specialized by other descriptions that specialize their concepts. For descriptions, an intention to specialize must be present (unless purely formal theories are considered, but even in this case a criterion of relevance is usually active). Specialization does not imply expansion (proper part) for descriptions. If there exists a concept that is defined by the specialized description, which is not d-used in the specializing one, the second only specializes a part of the first. If there exists a concept that is defined by the specializing description, which is not d-used by the specialized one, the first both specializes and expands the second.
Specialization as reification of a partial-order relation between social objects. For example, concepts that are apparently classified by other concepts; e.g. a manager that plays the role of buyer, where the role manager actually specializes the role buyer. Descriptions can be specialized by other descriptions that specialize their concepts or figures. For descriptions, an intention to specialize must be present (unless purely formal theories are considered, but even in this case a criterion of relevance is usually active). Specialization does not imply expansion (proper part) for descriptions. If there exists a concept that is defined by the specialized description, which is not d-used in the specializing one, the second only specializes a part of the first. If there exists a concept that is defined by the specializing description, which is not d-used by the specialized one, the first both specializes and expands the second.
To be understood as 'entity x has successor y'. Succession does not exclude connection, but it excludes overlapping. It can be direct or indirect, and assumes a choice (temporal, spatial, abstract, etc.) Cf. the cognitive 'path' schema. This is the transitive version.
Being component at time t. It holds for endurants only. This is important to model components that can change or be lost over time without affecting the identity of the whole.
Based on characterizing roles, collections specifically depend on some description.We can therefore build a new relation of unification between collections and the descriptions on which they depend. Unification is axiomatized by means of sufficient conditions, and is not temporalized, since changing the description (differently from changing some members) creates a new collection.
The use relations between endurants: an endurant e1 uses e2 within a perdurant in which both are participating. A rule then states that if e1 uses e2, e2 is used *in* a perdurant.
The "selected by" relations holding between regions and parameters. At least one region is supposed to be a value for a parameter.
The proper part relation between subjects.
Being about an antity with the main purpose of conventionally naming that entity. Typically, proper nouns identify entities.
The relation between an entity (playing the role of example, sample, prototype, master, etc.), and another that has all the properties of the first (or a given set of them), except space-time.
This relation supports the representation of conceptual regions by information objects. It is defined as a composed relation: an information object is expressed according to an information encoding description that maps a quality space. In other words, this means that a representation of conceptual regions within quality spaces requires an explicit conceptualization of the dimensions operating in the quality space. In still other words, a quality space can be mapped to a theory, which can be reified as a special kind of 'information encoding description'.
Referring to something is assumed here under a 'negotiated reference' approach, i.e. agents refer to entities by conceiving a description appropriate to context.
The main characteristic of abstract entities is that they do not have spatial nor temporal qualities, and they are not qualities themselves. The only class of abstract entities we consider in the present version of the upper ontology is that of quality regions (or simply regions). Quality spaces are special kinds of quality regions, being mereological sums of all the regions related to a certain quality type. The other examples of abstract entities (sets and facts) are only indicative.
A quality inherent in a non-physical endurant.
A region at which only abstract qualities can be directly located. It assumes some metrics for abstract (neither physical nor temporal) properties.
Eventive occurrences (events) are called achievements if they are atomic, otherwise they are accomplishments.Further developments: being 'achievement', 'accomplishment', 'state', 'event', etc. can be also considered 'aspects' of processes or of parts of them. For example, the same process 'rock erosion in the Sinni valley' can be seen as an accomplishment (what has brought the current state that e.g. we are trying to explain), as an achievement (the erosion process as the result of a previous accomplishment), as a state (collapsing the time interval of the erosion into a time point), as an event (what has changed our focus from a state to another).In the erosion case, we could have good motivations to shift from one aspect to another: a) causation focus, b) effectual focus, c) condensation d) transition (causality).
Eventive occurrences (events) are called achievements if they are atomic, otherwise they are accomplishments.Further developments: being 'achievement', 'accomplishment', 'state', 'event', etc. can be also considered 'aspects' of processes or of parts of them. For example, the same process 'rock erosion in the Sinni valley' can be seen as an accomplishment (what has brought the current state that e.g. we are trying to explain), as an achievement (the erosion process as the result of a previous accomplishment), as a state (collapsing the time interval of the erosion into a time point), as an event (what has changed our focus from a state to another).In the erosion case, we could have good motivations to shift from one aspect to another: a) causation focus, b) effectual focus, c) condensation d) transition (causality).
The common trait of amounts of matter is that they are endurants with no unity (according to Gangemi et a. 2001 none of them is an essential whole). Amounts of matter - 'stuffs' referred to by mass nouns like 'gold', 'iron', 'wood', 'sand', 'meat', etc. - are mereologically invariant, in the sense that they change their identity when they change some parts.
AKA arbitrary-collection.The mereological sum of any two or more endurants (physical or not). Arbitrary sums have no unity criterion (they are 'extensional').
A feature that is not part of its host, like a hole in a piece of cheese, the underneath of a table, the front of a house, or the shadow of a tree.
The main characteristic of endurants is that all of them are independent essential wholes. This does not mean that the corresponding property (being an endurant) carries proper unity, since there is no common unity criterion for endurants. Endurants can 'genuinely' change in time, in the sense that the very same endurant as a whole can have incompatible properties at different times. To see this, suppose that an endurant - say 'this paper' - has a property at a time t 'it's white', and a different, incompatible property at time t' 'it's yellow': in both cases we refer to the whole object, without picking up any particular part of it. Within endurants, we distinguish between physical and non-physical endurants, according to whether they have direct spatial qualities. Within physical endurants, we distinguish between amounts of matter, objects, and features.
An occurrence-type is stative or eventive according to whether it holds of the mereological sum of two of its instances, i.e. if it is cumulative or not. A sitting occurrence is stative since the sum of two sittings is still a sitting occurrence.In general, events differ from situations because they are not assumed to have a description from which they depend. They can be sequenced by some course, but they do not require a description as a unifying criterion.On the other hand, at any time, one can conceive a description that asserts the constraints by which an event of a certian type is such, and in this case, it becomes a situation.Since the decision of designing an explicit description that unifies a perdurant depends on context, task, interest, application, etc., when aligning an ontology do DLP, there can be indecision on where to align an event-oriented class. For example, in the WordNet alignment, we have decided to put only some physical events under 'event', e.g. 'discharge', in order to stress the social orientedness of DLP. But whereas we need to talk explicitly of the criteria by which we conceive discharge events, these will be put under 'situation'.Similar considerations are made for the other types of perdurants in DOLCE.A different notion of event (dealing with change) is currently investigated for further developments: being 'achievement', 'accomplishment', 'state', 'event', etc. can be also considered 'aspects' of processes or of parts of them. For example, the same process 'rock erosion in the Sinni valley' can be conceptualized as an accomplishment (what has brought the current state that e.g. we are trying to explain), as an achievement (the erosion process as the result of a previous accomplishment), as a state (if we collapse the time interval of the erosion into a time point), or as an event (what has changed our focus from a state to another).In the erosion case, we could have good motivations to shift from one aspect to another: a) causation focus, b) effectual focus, c) condensation d) transition (causality).If we want to consider all the aspects of a process together, we need to postulate a unifying descriptive set of criteria (i.e. a 'description'), according to which that process is circumstantiated in a 'situation'. The different aspects will arise as a parts of a same situation.
Features are 'parasitic entities', that exist insofar their host exists. Typical examples of features are holes, bumps, boundaries, or spots of color. Features may be relevant parts of their host, like a bump or an edge, or dependent regions like a hole in a piece of cheese, the underneath of a table, the front of a house, or the shadow of a tree, which are not parts of their host. All features are essential wholes, but no common unity criterion may exist for all of them. However, typical features have a topological unity, as they are singular entities.Here only features of physical endurants are considered.
An endurant with no mass, generically constantly depending on some agent. Non-physical endurants can have physical constituents (e.g. in the case of members of a collection).
Formerly known as description. A unitary endurant with no mass (non-physical), generically constantly depending on some agent, on some communication act, and indirectly on some agent participating in that act. Both descriptions (in the now current sense) and concepts are non-physical objects.
AKA 'entity'.Any individual in the DOLCE domain of discourse. The extensional coverage of DOLCE is as large as possible, since it ranges on 'possibilia', i.e all possible individuals that can be postulated by means of DOLCE axioms. Possibilia include physical objects, substances, processes, qualities, conceptual regions, non-physical objects, collections and even arbitrary sums of objects.The class 'particular' features a covering partition that includes: endurant, perdurant, quality, and abstract. There are also some subclasses defined as unions of subclasses of 'particular' for special purposes: spatio-temporal-particular (any particular except abstracts)- physical-realization (any realization of an information object, defined in the ExtendedDnS ontology).
Perdurants (AKA occurrences) comprise what are variously called events, processes, phenomena, activities and states. They can have temporal parts or spatial parts. For instance, the first movement of (an execution of) a symphony is a temporal part of the symphony. On the other hand, the play performed by the left side of the orchestra is a spatial part. In both cases, these parts are occurrences themselves. We assume that objects cannot be parts of occurrences, but rather they participate in them. Perdurants extend in time by accumulating different temporal parts, so that, at any time they are present, they are only partially present, in the sense that some of their proper temporal parts (e.g., their previous or future phases) may be not present. E.g., the piece of paper you are reading now is wholly present, while some temporal parts of your reading are not present yet, or any more. Philosophers say that endurants are entities that are in time, while lacking temporal parts (so to speak, all their parts flow with them in time). Perdurants, on the contrary, are entities that happen in time, and can have temporal parts (all their parts are fixed in time).
An endurant having a direct physical (at least spatial) quality.
The main characteristic of physical objects is that they are endurants with unity. However, they have no common unity criterion, since different subtypes of objects may have different unity criteria. Differently from aggregates, (most) physical objects change some of their parts while keeping their identity, they can have therefore temporary parts. Often physical objects (indeed, all endurants) are ontologically independent from occurrences (discussed below). However, if we admit that every object has a life, it is hard to exclude a mutual specific constant dependence between the two. Nevertheless, we may still use the notion of dependence to (weakly) characterize objects as being not specifically constantly dependent on other objects.
A quality inherent in a physical endurant.
A region at which only physical qualities can be directly located. It assumes some metrics for physical properties.
Within stative occurrences, we distinguish between states and processes according to homeomericity: sitting is classified as a state but running is classified as a process, since there are (very short) temporal parts of a running that are not themselves runnings. In general, processes differ from situations because they are not assumed to have a description from which they depend. They can be sequenced by some course, but they do not require a description as a unifying criterion. On the other hand, at any time, one can conceive a description that asserts the constraints by which a process of a certian type is such, and in this case, it becomes a situation. Since the decision of designing an explicit description that unifies a perdurant depends on context, task, interest, application, etc., when aligning an ontology do DLP, there can be indecision on where to align a process-oriented class. For example, in the WordNet alignment, we have decided to put only some physical processes under 'process', e.g. 'organic process', in order to stress the social orientedness of DLP. But whereas we need to talk explicitly of the criteria by which we conceive organic processes, these will be put under 'situation'. Similar considerations are made for the other types of perdurants in DOLCE. A different notion of event (dealing with change) is currently investigated for further developments: being 'achievement', 'accomplishment', 'state', 'event', etc. can be also considered 'aspects' of processes or of parts of them. For example, the same process 'rock erosion in the Sinni valley' can be conceptualized as an accomplishment (what has brought the current state that e.g. we are trying to explain), as an achievement (the erosion process as the result of a previous accomplishment), as a state (if we collapse the time interval of the erosion into a time point), or as an event (what has changed our focus from a state to another). In the erosion case, we could have good motivations to shift from one aspect to another: a) causation focus, b) effectual focus, c) condensation d) transition (causality). If we want to consider all the aspects of a process together, we need to postulate a unifying descriptive set of criteria (i.e. a 'description'), according to which that process is circumstantiated in a 'situation'. The different aspects will arise as a parts of a same situation.
The abstract content of a proposition. Abstract content is purely combinatorial: from this viewpoint, any content that can be generated by means of combinatorial rules is assumed to exist in the domain of quantification (reified abstracts).
An atomic region.
Qualities can be seen as the basic entities we can perceive or measure: shapes, colors, sizes, sounds, smells, as well as weights, lengths, electrical charges... 'Quality' is often used as a synonymous of 'property', but this is not the case in this upper ontology: qualities are particulars, properties are universals. Qualities inhere to entities: every entity (including qualities themselves) comes with certain qualities, which exist as long as the entity exists.
A quality space is a topologically maximal region. The constraint of maximality cannot be given completely in OWL, but a constraint is given that creates a partition out of all quality spaces (e.g. no two quality spaces can overlap mereologically).
We distinguish between a quality (e.g., the color of a specific rose), and its value (e.g., a particular shade of red). The latter is called quale, and describes the position of an individual quality within a certain conceptual space (called here quality space) Gardenfors (2000). So when we say that two roses have (exactly) the same color, we mean that their color qualities, which are distinct, have the same position in the color space, that is they have the same color quale.
Features that are relevant parts of their host, like a bump or an edge.
A mathematical set.
An ordinary space: geographical, cosmological, anatomical, topographic, etc.
A physical quality, q-located in (whose value is given within) ordinary spaces (geographical coordinates, cosmological positions, anatomical axes, etc.).
Dummy class for optimizing some property universes. It includes all entities that are not reifications of universals ('abstracts'), i.e. those entities that are in space-time.
Any region resulting from the composition of a space region with a temporal region, i.e. being present in region r at time t.
Within stative occurrences, we distinguish between states and processes according to homeomericity: sitting is classified as a state but running is classified as a process, since there are (very short) temporal parts of a running that are not themselves runnings.In general, states differ from situations because they are not assumed to have a description from which they depend. They can be sequenced by some course, but they do not require a description as a unifying criterion.On the other hand, at any time, one can conceive a description that asserts the constraints by which a state of a certian type is such, and in this case, it becomes a situation.Since the decision of designing an explicit description that unifies a perdurant depends on context, task, interest, application, etc., when aligning an ontology do DLP, there can be indecision on where to align a state-oriented class. For example, in the WordNet alignment, we have decided to put only some physical states under 'state', e.g. 'turgor', in order to stress the social orientedness of DLP. But whereas we need to talk explicitly of the criteria by which we conceive turgor states, these will be put under 'situation'.Similar considerations are made for the other types of perdurants in DOLCE.A different notion of event (dealing with change) is currently investigated for further developments: being 'achievement', 'accomplishment', 'state', 'event', etc. can be also considered 'aspects' of processes or of parts of them. For example, the same process 'rock erosion in the Sinni valley' can be conceptualized as an accomplishment (what has brought the current state that e.g. we are trying to explain), as an achievement (the erosion process as the result of a previous accomplishment), as a state (if we collapse the time interval of the erosion into a time point), or as an event (what has changed our focus from a state to another).In the erosion case, we could have good motivations to shift from one aspect to another: a) causation focus, b) effectual focus, c) condensation d) transition (causality).If we want to consider all the aspects of a process together, we need to postulate a unifying descriptive set of criteria (i.e. a 'description'), according to which that process is circumstantiated in a 'situation'. The different aspects will arise as a parts of a same situation.
An occurrence-type is stative or eventive according to whether it holds of the mereological sum of two of its instances, i.e. if it is cumulative or not. A sitting occurrence is stative since the sum of two sittings is still a sitting occurrence.
A temporal location quality.
A quality inherent in a perdurant.
A region at which only temporal qualities can be directly located. It assumes a metrics for time.
A temporal region, measured according to a calendar.
A Perdurant that exemplifies the intentionality of an agent. Could it be aborted, incomplete, mislead, while remaining a (potential) accomplishment ... The point here is that having a result depends on a method, then an action remains an action under incomplete results. As a matter of fact, if we neutralize intentionality, a purely topological, post-hoc view is at odds with the notion of incomplete accomplishments.
In dependency terms, an activity is an action that is generically constantly dependent on a (at least partly) shared plan adopted by participants. This condition implies that an action must be sequenced by a task.Intuitively, activities are complex actions that are at least partly conventionally planned.
A catch-all class used to join agentive objects (either physical or social). Agents are dispositionally so, in the sense that they internally represent descriptions, and in particular plans, goals and possible actions, but they do not necessarily act. In everyday language, agent is used in this sense, but also to tell that something has acted in a certain way, or to say that something has an initiator or leading role in some action. In DLP, the performs relation encodes these notions.
AKA Agentive-role.A role that can only be played by agents.
Agentive figures are those which are assigned (agentive) roles from a society or community; hence, they can act like a physical agent. Typical agentive figures are societies, organizations, and in general all socially constructed persons. Agentive figures are not dependent on roles defined or used in the same descriptions they are defined or used, but they can act because they depute some powers to some of those roles. In other words, a figure classified by some agentive role can play that role because there are other roles in the descriptions that define or use the figure. Those roles classifies endurants that result to act for the figure. For example, an employee acts for an organization that deputes the role (e.g. turner) that classifies the employee. Simply put, a guy working as a turner at FIAT acts for (or on behalf of) FIAT. In complex figures, like organizations or companies, a total agency is possible when an endurant plays a delegate or representative role of the figure. Since figures are social objects, it is conceivable to find agentive figures that act for other agentive figures.
Within Physical objects, a special place have those to which we ascribe generic intentionality (compatibly to Brentano's distinction, the ability to internally represent a description). These are called Agentive, as opposite to Non-agentive. In general, we assume that agentive objects are constituted by non-agentive objects: an organism is constituted by bodily organs, a robot is constituted by some machinery, and so on. Among non-agentive physical objects we have for example houses, bodily organs, pieces of wood, etc. Generic agentivity is defined here in a wide sense as implying representation or conception (to be characterized in a dedicated - but not developed as yet - ontology of mind). A representation or conception only requires intentionality in Brentano's terms (i.e., the ability to represent something to oneself). See also 'rational physical object'.
A social object that is assumed to internally represent a plan. Since social objects are dependent on physical ones, it is not trivial to interpret the local sense in which a social object 'internally represents' a plan. For example, an institution can have the plan to promote or regulate some activities, but this is possible by means of the powers conferred to it by some legal system, through its representatives, and that plan has to be executed by means of the physical agents that 'act for' the institution.
An event occurring in the (embodied) mind.
The modal descriptions depending on some mental attitude, represented here by means of a relation between roles and tasks.
A state of the (embodied) mind
Collections are social objects which, although not defined by a description, depend both on member entities and on some concepts or figures, hence indirectly on descriptions. While we could talk in general of collections of any kind of entities (events, objects, abstracts, etc.), we restrict here our attention to collections of endurants, and to the concepts that classify them (i.e. roles).
A collection with only agents as members.
Here communication is taken in a rather wide sense, being possible as an (intentional) activity as well as a phenomenon.
AKA C-Description. A non-physical object that is defined by a description s, and whose function is classifying entities from a ground ontology in order to build situations that can satisfy s.
A description whose purpose is defining a figure.
A concept that classifies (in particular, it 'sequences') perdurants (processes, events, or states), as a component of some description. Courses are the descriptive counterpart of perdurants, and, since perdurants have endurants as participants, they are usually the function of some role.
A description is a social object which represents a conceptualization (e.g. a mental object or state), hence it is generically dependent on some agent and communicable. Descriptions define or use concepts or figures, are expressed by an information object and can be satisfied by situations. The typology of descriptions is still preliminary.
A role played by descriptions only. Usable for metalinguistic notions, like those that deal with granular partitions of knowledge, strata of reality, argumentation, etc.
Desires are characterized here as modal description dependent on the cognitive (or 'mental') states of an agent. It is difficult to say more than that without reusing an ontology of cognitive states.Informally: a desire is a description that involves some (possible or actual) 'desire towards' attitude by an agent, and is ultimately motivated by evolutionary features of an organism (or by built-in features if the agent is artificial), which are (or used to be) an advantage for it.
a.k.a. 'social individual'. Figures are social objects defined or used by descriptions, but differently from concepts, they do not classify entities. Examples of figures are organizations, political-geographic objects, sacred symbols, etc.
Fluxes are processes that (also) contain accomplishments as constituents. In other words, fluxes emerge out of accomplishments.
A perceptual structure, from the descriptive viewpoint. In other words, this encodes the conditions by which a configuration, structure, or arrangement is perceived as a meaningful whole by a perceiving agent.
We are proposing here a restrictive notion of goal that relies upon its desirability by some agent, which does not necessarily play a role in the execution of the plan the goal is a part of. For example, an agent can have an attitude towards some task defined in a plan, e.g. duty towards, which is different from desiring it (desire towards). We might say that a goal is usually desired by the creator or beneficiary of a plan. The minimal constraint for a goal is that it is a proper part of a plan.For example, a desire to start a relationship can become a goal if someone takes action (or lets someone else take it for her sake) to obtain it.
A parameter valued by regions that are used asindicators for some behaviour or event to be checked.
An information encoding system is a description that involves information objects. They can be divided into 1) axiomatic systems, which provide roles and operations to define formal descriptions (e.g. theories), 2) combinatorial systems, which provide roles and operations to create valid information objects (e.g. grammars), 3) classification systems, which are contexts of (ev. ordered) lists of information objects, and 4) informal encoding systems, which provide roles and operations to define informal descriptions (e.g. narratives).
Information objects are social objects. They are realized by some entity. They are ordered (expressed according to) by some system for information encoding. Consequently, they are dependent from an encoding as well as from a concrete realization.They can express a description (the ontological equivalent of a meaning/conceptualization), can be about any entity, and can be interpreted by an agent.From a communication perspective, an information object can play the role of "message". From a semiotic perspective, it playes the role of "expression".
The course of events typical of the life of an object (kind).
A role used to express logical levels within some layering description or granular partition. A typical example is the Linnean taxonomic ordering, where Phylum or Species are hierarchical roles.
No easy definition of artifactual properties is possible, hence it is better to rely on alternative descriptions and roles: a physical object that shows or is known to have an artifactual origin that counts in the tasks an ontology is supposed to support, will be a material artifact. On the other hand, physical objects that do not show that origin, or that origin is unimportant for the task of the ontology, will be physical bodies. Formally, a restriction is provided here that requires that the collection whose members are (at least some of the) proper parts of a material artifact is *unified* by a plan or project.
A description that contains a specification to do, realize, behave, etc. Subclasses are plan, technique, practice, project, etc.
A modal description is any part of a description that has a unity criterion consisting in the specification of a modal target (some course), and it can be a right, power, duty, etc. Notice that modal descriptions can appear in conventionalized descriptions as well as in idiosyncratic assessements, narratives, promises, etc. From the formal semantic viewpoint, a modal description is the reification of a relation involving a modal logic operator.
A tipology of non-agentive figures is currently under investigation.
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Within Physical objects, a special place have those to which we ascribe intentions, beliefs, and desires. These are called Agentive, as opposite to Non-agentive. Intentionality is understood here as the capability of heading for/dealing with objects or states of the world. This is an important area of ontological investigation we haven't properly explored yet, so our suggestions are really very preliminary. A possible modelling of case roles has been started within the descriptions plugin that could be embedded within basic DOLCE. In general, we assume that agentive objects are constituted by non-agentive objects: an organism is constituted by bodily organs, a robot is constituted by some machinery, and so on. Among non-agentive physical objects we have for example houses, body organs, pieces of wood, etc.
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A social object that is not assumed to internally represent a description. Since social objects are dependent on physical ones, it is not trivial to interpret the local sense in which a social object 'internally represents' a plan. See 'agentive-social-object' for some discussion.
A concept that classifies (in particular, it is 'valued by') regions, as defined by some description. Parameters are the descriptive counterpart of regions, and, as regions represent the qualities of perdurants or endurants, they can be requisites for some role or course.A parameter has at least one region that is a value for it.
A course used to sequence phenomena (non-intentional processes).
A phenomenon is basically a process that does not include any intentional active participation. Therefore, it cannot be sequenced by a task.It can be seen as an accomplishment when some intentionality puts boundaries on it (although it is not claimed to be inherently intentional). On the other hand, a purely physical phenomenon does not seem to have inherent boundaries either ... and also for biological processes as well as economic processes this seems to be disputable. If the boundary hypothesis is discarded, phenomenon should migrate under process.
A phenomenon having a physical endurant as participant.
Any physical particular that realizes a non-physical endurant. Such physical particulars can be either physical endurants, physical qualities, physical regions, perdurants with at least one physical participant, or a situation with one physical entity in its setting.Ultimately, a physical realization depends on at least one physical endurant (each of the others physical entity types depend on a physical endurant to be considered as such).
A plan is a method for executing or performing a procedure or a stage of a procedure.A plan must use both at least one role played by an agent, and at least one task.Finally, a plan has a goal as proper part, and can also have regulations and other descriptions as proper parts.
A social method carried out explicitly or by tradition, spontaneously emerged, or moderately or strongly regulated.
A project is a proactively satisfied method. Differently from a plan, a project includes at least one 'product' role to be played by some endurant (e.g. a house), or one 'result' role played by a perdurant with a definite participant (e.g. a restored state of a house).
Either a rational physical object (e.g. an animal capable of meta-representations), or a social object acted by a rational physical object (e.g. an organization).
In this ontology, a rational object is encoded as having the ability to internally represent meta-descriptions (descriptions that have other descriptions playing roles used by them). Other theories of rational agency assume desires and intentions for these objects, but in principle any agent can have desires and intentions: the very difference seems to be the ability to choose among different desires or intentions by going 'meta-level'.
Reconstructed fluxes are fluxes that only contain accomplishments as members.
A description usually requiring a C-SAT satisfaction for a situation. Norms, codes of practice, etc. are examples.
A non-social relation(ship): formal, linguistic, etc. It is considered here a theory, because relations are established in order to give an ordering to some reality.
Also known as 'functional role'.A concept that classifies (in particular, it is 'played by') endurants, as used in some description. Roles are the descriptive counterpart of endurants, and, as endurants participate in perdurants, they usually have courses as modal targets (see).The typology of roles is still preliminary.
A situation is a social object that appears in the domain of an ontology only because there is a description whose components can 'carve up' a view (setting) on that domain. A situation has to satisfy a description (see below for ways of defining the satisfies relation), and it has to be setting for at least one entity.In other words, it is the ontological counterpart (with due local differences or restrictions) of settings (situations from SC, contexts, episodes, states of affairs, structures, configurations, cases, etc.).A perdurant is usually the only mandatory constituent of a setting.Two descriptions of a same situation are possible, otherwise we would result in a solipsistic ontology. The time and space (and possibly other qualities) of a situation are the time and space of the perdurants in the setting.
Examples of Social Descriptions are laws, norms, shares, peace treaties, etc., which are generically dependent on societies.Social descriptions are dependent on a community of agents.
A catch-all class for entities from the social world. It includes agentive and non-agentive socially-constructed objects: descriptions, concepts, figures, collections, information objects. It could be equivalent to 'non-physical object', but we leave the possibility open of 'private' non-physical objects.
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A social description defining roles for the interaction of rational agents.
A role created and maintained by a society.
A role that involves responsibility, e.g. both duties and rights, in order to perform some task. It usually involves additional rights and/or powers in contexts (descriptions) different from the one that defines the status.
A role played exactly by two objects at the same time, e.g.: brother, sibling.
A course used to sequence activities or other controllable perdurants (some states, processes), usually within methods. They must be defined by a method, but can be *used* by other kinds of descriptions. They are desire targets of some role played by an agent. Tasks can be complex, and ordered according to an abstract succession relation. Tasks can relate to ground activities or decision making; the last kind deals with typical flowchart content. A task is different both from a flowchart node, and from an action or action type.Tasks can be considered shortcuts for plans, since at least one role played by an agent has a desire attitude towards them (possibly different from the one that puts the task into action). In principle, tasks could be transformed into explicit plans.
A technique is a practical method to obtain some modification in the environment (or evaluation of an environment) that fulfils some task.
This is used in a wide cultural sense: a theory about something, expressed in a rather systematic way, but not necessarily public (although communicable in principle). An axiomatic theory is not a theory in this sense, although we can expect an axiomatic theory to be the formal representation of a generic theory.
An information encoding system that provides rules for (ev. ordered) lists of information objects, e.g terminologies, subjects, knowledge domains.
An information encoding system that provides roles and operations to create valid information objects (e.g. grammars, templates, codes).
An information object ordered by a shematic iconic code
A code that orders the generation of information objects according to formally defined vocabulary, axioms, rules, etc.
An information realization based on conventional body movements. It is a primary code of communication (primary means that it is an original bodily expression, specially if firstly learnt).
A set of rules for the generation of a (closed or open set of) information objects.
A part of a word as it can be realized by writing.
A spoken information realization can be 'about' a grapheme (as in reading), but it does not 'realize' it. BTW, since spoken realizations are a 'primary' code of communication, the difference between direct and indirect spoken realizations (reading) is often ontologically understated.
A grapheme is not necessarily able to express a meaning (description), although it can in principle (e.g. 'a' in English).
An information object ordered by a visual code.
Any physical entity that realizes an information object.
An information object ordered by (encoded according to) a language.
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A part of a word that can express a meaning.
A description expressed by a text, and ordered by additional semiotic codes (narratological structures).
A part of a word as it can be realized by voice.
A written information realization can be 'about' a phoneme (as in the case of transcription systems), but it does not 'realize' it.
A phoneme is not necessarily able to express a meaning (description), although it can in principle (e.g. 'a' in English).
A domain of knowledge, typically expressed by one term, related to other subjects in a partial order hierarchy and with some topological properties; e.g. biology, sport, politics.
A complex linguistic object, expressed according to a language and still independent from a particular physical realization.
An information realization based on conventional sounds. It is a primary code of communication (primary means that it is an original bodily expression, specially if firstly learnt).
A linguistic object consisting of a string (independently of its physical realization). Its topological unity can change according to its physical realization: as a written realization, its boundaries are blank spaces, as a spoken realization, sometimes is silence, sometimes not, and higher order features intervene.
Grammatical entities such as nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc. are roles defined by a grammar, and words (or larger linguistic objects) can play those roles in a given language. E.g., the word 'share' can play both 'verb' and 'noun' roles in contemporary English, while the word 'come' can only play the 'verb' role in English, and the 'adverb' or 'conjunction' roles in Italian (but if we consider a word as only realized by phonemes, i.e. if we consider the oral realizations of 'come', there is no common word in the two languages).
An information realization based on conventional symbols.
It is a secondary code of communication (secondary means that it is about an original bodily expression, i.e. a primary code). Therefore, we are not considering here early forms of iconic expression, which could be considered primary.
The roles employed to characterize communication. E.g. the roles from Jakobson's theory of communication.
Any situation that satisfies Jakobson's communication theory.
The class of situations that satisfy the semiotic interpretation function (given an expression and a context, a meaning is provided).
A combinatorial code intended to ordering of information objects involved in the semiotic 'interpretation function'.
A semiotic role is a non-agentive role defined by the interpretation function.It should be specialized within a communication setting by a role that is played by some entity in a communication situation. Semiotic roles are used to fill the universe of the so-called 'interpretation function'.Two of them are specialized by two communication roles (message and context).
The context role in Jakobson's theory of communication.
The channel role in Jakobson's theory of communication.
The code role in Jakobson's theory of communication, which should be played by an information-encoding-system.
A specialization of the interpreter role, played by the agents trying to conceive the description expressed by some information object created by agents playing the encoder role.
A specialization of the interpreter role, played by creators of information objects expressing some description.
Expression is a semiotic role played by information objects. It is used to fill the first domain of the so-called 'interpretation function'. It can be considered equivalent to the 'message' communication role, but since communication theory and semiotic theories are different, it is more correct to say that a message role specializes an expression role.
A generalization of the encoder and decoder roles in Jakobson's theory of communication, which should be played by an agent.
Meaning is a semiotic role played by descriptions whatsoever. It is used to fill the range of the so-called 'interpretation function'.It is not equivalent to any communication function.
The message role in Jakobson's theory of communication, played by information objects. It specializes the expression role from semiotic interpretation theory.
Jakobson defined six functions of communication that are compatible with Shannon's theory of information. They are the 'message', here covered by 'Message-Role', the context, covered here by 'C-Context', the code, covered by 'Code', plus 'Channel', 'Encoder', and 'Decoder', which are introduced below. Message-Role, C-Context, and Code can also be viewed as playing a semiotic role (Expression, S-Context, Semiotic-Code). For a communication theory in general, we also need other components that are not specified in Jakobson's theory', e.g. 'turn-taking', governing the sequence of a communication process, 'communication parameters', governing the values that participants and events of a communication should have in order for the communication to be successful (i.e. for the communication method to be satisfied), 'conversational maxims' (superordered theories) that provide guidelines for communication to be successful, etc.
S-context (semiotic context) is played by descriptions and is a semiotic role. It is used to fill the second domain of the so-called 'interpretation function'.It may be equivalent to the 'c-context' communication role, but since communication theory and semiotic theories are different, it is more correct to say that c-context (communication context) specializes s-context.
Interpretation functions are descriptions that can include roles either for semiotics or for formal semantics.Here we only characterize a basic, simple theory of semiotic interpretation. Three semiotic roles are defined: s-context (semiotic context), expression, and meaning.It has complex dependencies to mental objects, social objects, as well as references to entities as such, but we currently prefer to put it here as a placeholder (a forthcoming ontology of mind should give some more detail on those issues). See semiotic roles for further comments.