Verifying Determinism of Concurrent Systems Which Use Unbounded Arrays (Extended Abstract)

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Abstract

Our main result says that determinism of a concurrent system which uses unbounded arrays (i.e. memories) can be verified by considering an appropriate finite array size.

That is made possible by restricting the ways in which array indices and values can be used within the system. The restrictions are those of data independence: the system must not perform any operations on the indices and values, but it is only allowed to input them, store them, and output them. Equality tests between indices are also allowed.

The restrictions are satisfied by many concurrent systems which use arrays to model memories or databases. As a case study, we have verified that a database system which allows users to lock, read and write records at multiple security levels is secure.

1 The Parameterised Verification Problem

Concurrent systems are frequently infinite-state because they have parameters that can vary unboundedly. For example, a memory cache is likely to be parameterised by the data types of addresses and values, a protocol for fault-tolerance is likely to be parameterised by the number of nodes in the network, etc. Given such a system, we typically want to be able to consider all possible instantiations of its parameters, rather than having to restrict our attention to one instantiation at a time. Thus we come to the Parameterised Verification Problem:

PVP. Given a parameterised concurrent system `P` and a condition `C`, does `P` satisfy `C` for all instantiations of the parameters? ■

There has recently been much research on the PVP. It is undecidable in general [AK86], and so most effort has been put into either finding decision procedures for restricted versions of it (see e.g. [Wol86, JP93, ID96a, HB95, HDB97, GS92, YJL96, EN96]), or providing automated techniques whose termination is unpredictable or which require user involvement (see e.g. [HL95, HGD95, CZ+97, HIB97, CGJ95, ID96b, KM+97]).

The main result of this paper, Theorem 1, says that in order to verify that a concurrent system `P` which uses unbounded arrays (i.e. memories) is deterministic for all array sizes (finite or infinite), it suffices to consider a single appropriate finite size. In other words, the theorem provides a decision procedure for the following restricted version of PVP: the parameters are data types of array indices and values, and the

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condition `C` is the property of being deterministic. The procedure is guaranteed to terminate whenever the data types sizes which it suffices to consider can be computed in a finite time and the resulting instantiation of `P` is finite-state (which are both issues that are orthogonal to the parameterisation).

Since checking whether the appropriate instantiation of `P` is deterministic can be done by a single run of a model checker,[1] the paper contributes to turning model checkers into practical tools for *verification*, rather than primarily *refutation* [Rus97].

Before we present Theorem 1 in Section 4, we shall explain what we mean by arrays whose index and value types are parameters, and review determinism, a condition with very important applications in the field of computer security. In the remaining two sections, we shall outline the database system case study, and point towards future work.

In the space available, we could not afford to go into technical details. The technical report [LR98a] contains the full paper, including a sketch of the proof of Theorem 1.

2 Unbounded Arrays

The main novelty in the paper is that we consider concurrent systems which can use arrays whose indices and values come from variable types, i.e. data types that are parameters of the system. Such an array is unbounded because its size is the size of the type of its indices, and we allow type parameters to vary unboundedly.

Our main result, Theorem 1, is made possible by restricting the ways in which array indices and values can be used within the system. More precisely, the system is required to be *data independent* with respect to the types of indices and values: it must not apply any operations to elements of those types, but it is only allowed to input them, store them, and output them. Equality tests between indices are also allowed. From another point of view, we have shown that it is possible to relax the data independence conditions by allowing arrays and still obtain finite instantiations which suffice for verification. (A precise definition of data independence can be found in [Laz98b], and approximate definitions in [Ros98, LR98a].)

Many systems which use arrays to model memories or databases satisfy the data independence conditions on indices and values. A typical example is a memory cache which uses an array to model the main memory that it is interacting with, and whose replacement policy does not involve calculation. Indeed, the only operation such a cache needs to perform on indices or values is equality tests between indices.

Theorem 1 is also made possible by having the indices and values belong to *different* data types, so that for example nested indexing is not allowed.

For simplicity, we shall be considering a single variable type `X` of indices and a single variable type `Y` of values. Let `Array(X, Y)` denote the type of all arrays with indices from `X` and values from `Y`. Such arrays can also be thought of as maps from `X` into `Y`. For creating and using them, we allow only the following operations, whose meanings are self-explanatory:

```
init(X) :: Y -> Array(X, Y)
getval  :: (Array(X, Y), X) -> Y
update  :: (Array(X, Y), X, Y) -> Array(X, Y)
```

In addition to allowing arrays whose indices and values come from variable types, Theorem 1 allows uninterpreted many-valued predicates on variable types which are not types of array values, and uninterpreted constants of variable types. Here by "many-valued predicates" we mean functions into fixed finite types, and by "uninterpreted" we mean that the predicates and constants are just symbols and that the verification should establish that the condition (in this case determinism) is satisfied for all possible interpretations. Such predicates and constants will be needed in the database system case study (see Section 5).

[1] Determinism checking is supported directly in the model checker FDR2 [Ros98, FS97]. In other model checkers, some preliminary transformations may be necessary: for example, the condition of being deterministic can be expressed in a linear temporal logic on a product of the labelled transition system of `P` with itself.

3 Determinism

A concurrent system P is said to be *deterministic* if, from the point of view of its environment, it cannot exhibit any nondeterminism. More precisely, there must not exist an execution of a sequence t of communications after which P can accept some communication a and a possibly different execution of t after which P can refuse a. In the process algebra CSP [Hoa85, Ros98], it is appropriate to also require livelock (i.e. divergence) freedom, so that the condition of being deterministic can be formalised as:

- $(t^\frown\langle a\rangle, \{\}) \in \mathit{failures}_\perp(\mathtt{P}) \Rightarrow (t, \{a\}) \notin \mathit{failures}_\perp(\mathtt{P})$, and
- $\mathit{divergences}(\mathtt{P}) = \{\}$.

Determinism has been studied most extensively in CSP. Apart from its great significance in the theory, it has found very important applications in the field of computer security. Namely, it has been established [RWW96, Ros95, Wul97, Ros98] that the key to specifying that there is no information flow across a concurrent system from a high security user to a low security user is the determinism of a suitably formed abstraction: what the system looks like to the low user when the actions of the high user are turned into internal nondeterminism.

4 The Theorem

For concreteness and practical applicability, we have stated and proved Theorem 1 in terms of CSP_M [Sca98, Ros98], the machine-readable version of CSP which is the language used in the model checker FDR2 [Ros98, FS97].

The following quantities, defined for a concurrent system P and a variable data type X, will be used in the theorem to compute the sufficient size for the type of indices:

$W^{\mathtt{P}}_{\mathtt{X}}$ is the maximum number of elements of type X that P ever has to store for future use. Here it is crucial that we do not need to count elements which are stored only because they are indices of array components that have previously been assigned to or read from. This enables $W^{\mathtt{P}}_{\mathtt{X}}$, and hence the sufficient size for X in the theorem, to be finite even when P may during its execution access an unbounded number of different array components.

$L^{\mathtt{P}}_{?,\mathtt{X}}$ is the maximum number of elements of type X that can be input in a *single* communication of P.

$L^{\mathtt{P}}_{\overline{?},\mathtt{X}}$ is the maximum number of elements of type X that can be input in a *single* communication of P without being recorded in it. (This quantity can be made nonzero only by renamings which omit inputs from communications.)

$L^{\mathtt{P}}_{\sqcap,\mathtt{X}}$ is the maximum number of elements of type X that can be chosen in a *single* internal nondeterministic choice in P.

The quantity $W^{\mathtt{P}}_{\mathtt{X}}$ virtually always dominates the calculations. In fact, in most practical examples, including the case study in the next section, the remaining three quantities have values 1, 0, 0 or 1, 0, 1 respectively.

For simplicity, we state the theorem with only one uninterpreted many-valued predicate and only one uninterpreted constant.

Theorem 1 *Suppose* P *is a concurrent system with two variable types* X *and* Y *with respect to which it is data independent, except that it can use:*

- *arrays of type* `Array(X, Y)`*, i.e. arrays with indices from* X *and values from* Y*,*
- *an uninterpreted K-valued predicate* r *on* X*, and*
- *an uninterpreted constant* c *of type* Y*.*

Suppose also that `P` *does not use any equality tests between elements of type* `Y`*, and that no state of* `P` *has two possible communications that differ only in outputs of type* `Y`*. (Two mild regularity conditions are also needed: see [LR98a].)*

Let $B = 2 \times W_{\mathtt{X}}^{\mathtt{P}} + \max(L_{?,\mathtt{X}}^{\mathtt{P}} + L_{\overline{?},\mathtt{X}}^{\mathtt{P}}, L_{\sqcap,\mathtt{X}}^{\mathtt{P}})$.

Then `P` *is deterministic for all instantiations of* `X`*,* `Y`*,* `r` *and* `c` *(with finite or infinite* `X` *and* `Y`*), provided it is deterministic for the following instantiation:*

- `X` *is defined to be any type with exactly* $(B+2) \times K$ *elements,*
- `Y` *is defined to be any type with exactly* 2 *elements, say* `{0, 1}`*,*
- `r` *is defined to map exactly* $B+2$ *elements of* `X` *to each of the* K *elements in its range, and*
- `c` *is defined to have any fixed value from* `Y`*, say* `0`*.*

Proof. The proof uses symbolic labelled transition systems [HL95, LR98b] and factoring out of symmetry [CE+96, ES96, ID96a, Jen96], and involves much additional development to be able to deal with arrays and with the stated definition of $W_{\mathtt{X}}^{\mathtt{P}}$.

A sketch can be found in [LR98a]; the full proof will appear in [Laz98a]. ■

It is not impossible for B to be infinite, in which case the theorem is unlikely to be useful in practice. (As we have said, the question of whether B is infinite is orthogonal to the parameterisation by `X` and `Y`.)

When `P` does not use an uninterpreted predicate, the theorem can be applied with $K = 1$.

4.1 Decision Procedures

The theorem immediately gives us a decision procedure for our restricted version of the PVP: compute B and then check whether the resulting instantiation of `P` is deterministic. As we have remarked, this procedure terminates provided B is computable in a finite time and the instantiation of `P` is finite-state.

The efficiency of the determinism checking phase can be considerably improved by automatically factoring out the symmetry associated with the type `X` and by allowing at most one input of type `Y` to have the value `1` in any execution. Moreover, by performing a suitable *symbolic check*, the computation of B can effectively be done lazily during the check itself, resulting in greater accuracy.

It is also possible to automatically check whether the assumptions of the theorem, or at least their suitable stronger versions, are satisfied.

At the time of writing, extensions to the model checker FDR2 to fully support the obtained decision procedures are being planned.

4.2 Related Work

We are not aware of any general results in the literature enabling systems that can access unboundedly many different array components (i.e. memory locations) during their execution to be verified by reduction to finite instantiations (as required by most model checkers). Such systems were typically verified by one of the following methods:

- applying existing data independence theorems together with special-case observations or arguments, as in [HM+95, ID96a, LR96, Ros98];
- symbolic execution which is not guaranteed to always terminate, or which relies on the number of array accesses being bounded, as in [VBJ97, HIB97];
- special-case abstractions, as in [Gra94].

We also cannot point to previous results facilitating reduction to finite instantiations when uninterpreted predicates on variable types are present, although it is substantially easier to extend the known methods to accomodate them than it is for unbounded arrays.

5 A Case Study

With the help of Theorem 1, we have verified that a database system which allows users to lock, read and write records at multiple security levels is secure. The system has similar functionality to one of the case studies in [Wul97].[2]

As usual in this sort of analysis, it suffices to look at only two security levels of user, on the grounds that more complex security policies can be partitioned into multiple binary analyses: see [RWW96, Ros95, Wul97, Ros98] for details. The system thus works with two user identities: a high security user `Hugh` and a low security user `Lois`.

Without going into details, the system consists of a manager process `DBM` and a disk process `Disk` which stores the current values of all records. It has two variable types, `RECORDS` and `DATA`, and it uses an array with indices from `RECORDS` and values from `DATA` to model the contents of the disk. It also uses an uninterpreted 2-valued predicate `rlevel :: RECORDS -> {0, 1}` which provides the security level associated with each record, and an uninterpreted constant `inval :: DATA` for the initial value of all the records.

That the system is secure is understood to mean that there can be no information flow from `Hugh` to `Lois` across it. As we have remarked in Section 3, this can be verified by verifying that a suitable abstraction of the system, namely what it looks like to `Lois` when `Hugh`'s actions are turned into internal nondeterminism, is deterministic [RWW96, Ros95, Wul97, Ros98].

Let us call this abstraction `P`. It turns out that `P` satisfies all the assumptions of Theorem 1 with `X`, `Y`, `r` and `c` now being called `RECORDS`, `DATA`, `rlevel` and `inval` respectively, and that

$$B = 2 \times (\texttt{limit(Hugh)} + \texttt{limit(Lois)}) + 1$$

where `limit(Hugh)` and `limit(Lois)` are limits of how many records the users can have open or locked at any one time. Thus Theorem 1 has successfully reduced the problem of verifying that the system is secure for each instantiation of `RECORDS`, `DATA`, `rlevel` and `inval` to verifying that it is secure for a single finite instantiation.

For a few small values of `limit(Hugh)` and `limit(Lois)`, we have verified on the model checker FDR2 that the reduced instantiation of `P` is indeed deterministic. It remains an open problem, outside the scope of the present paper, to by an automated verification establish determinism for any `limit(Hugh)` and `limit(Lois)` and when one or both of those limits are removed.

A complete CSP$_M$ script with the case study can be found at:

`http://www.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/publications/books/concurrency/examples/security/`

6 Further Work

We should stress that the techniques we have developed are not restricted to verifying determinism. Indeed, we hope to obtain similar theorems for verifying arbitrary conditions. In CSP, that means for verifying that a concurrent system which uses unbounded arrays refines [Hoa85, Ros98] a given specification.[3]

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[2] [Wul97] is concerned with abstractions and using them to reason about information flow and computer security; it does not deal with the Parameterised Verification Problem.

[3] Some such refinement checks have been included in the script for the case study obtainable from the Web.

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