

# Online Learning with Expert Advice

- Decision Maker chooses at time  $t$   $\underline{x}_t \in \Delta_n$ , ( $\Delta_n = \{\underline{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n | \underline{x} \geq 0, \sum x_i = 1\}$ ) a probability distribution over  $n$  options.
- Environment / Adversary reveals a loss vector  $\underline{l}_t \in [0, 1]^n$ .
- Loss of DM at time  $t$  is  $\underline{x}_t \cdot \underline{l}_t$ .

$$\text{Regret} = \sum_{t=1}^T \underline{l}_t \cdot \underline{x}_t - \min_{\underline{x} \in \Delta^n} \sum_{t=1}^T \underline{x} \cdot \underline{l}_t$$

$$= \sum_{t=1}^T \underline{l}_t \cdot \underline{x}_t - \min_{i \in [n]} \sum_{t=1}^T l_{t,i}$$

## Multiplicative Weight Update Algorithm

$$\underline{w}_1 = (1, \dots, 1) \in \mathbb{R}^n$$

For each  $t=1, \dots, T$

- $\underline{x}_t = \frac{1}{Z_t} \underline{w}_t$  where  $Z_t = \sum_i w_{t,i}$ . (\*).
- $w_{t+1,i} = w_{t,i} \cdot \exp(-\eta l_{t,i})$ .

Theorem: Regret (MWUA) =  $O(\sqrt{T \log n})$ .

## Interpretation of (\*)

$$\min_{\underline{x} \in \Delta_n} \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \underline{x} \cdot \underline{l}_s - \frac{1}{2} H(\underline{x})$$

$$x_i \propto \exp\left(-\eta \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} l_{s,i}\right)$$

$$\text{arg softmin } \left( + \eta \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \underline{l}_s \right).$$

$$H(\underline{x}) = - \sum_i x_i \ln x_i$$

$$\underline{x} \geq 0$$

$$\sum_i x_i = 1$$

$$\underline{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

$$p_i \propto \exp(-x_i)$$

## Boosting:

Let  $\{x_1, \dots, x_m\}$  as training data, with labels  $\{y_1, \dots, y_m\}$ .

DM: Pickis distribution  $\underline{p}_t$  over  $\{1, \dots, m\}$ . (using MWUA)

Weak Learner: guarantees  $h_t$ , s.t.  $\text{err}(h_t; \underline{p}_t) \leq \frac{1}{2} - \gamma$ .

$$l_{t,i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } h_t(x_i) = y_i \\ 0 & \text{if } h_t(x_i) \neq y_i \end{cases}$$

$$\underline{l}_t \cdot \underline{p}_t = 1 - \text{err}(h_t; \underline{p}_t) \geq \frac{1}{2} + \gamma$$

If we play for  $T$  rounds, then

$$\text{Loss}_{\text{DM}} = \sum_{t=1}^T \underline{l}_t \cdot \underline{p}_t \geq T \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} + \gamma\right).$$

MWUA Theorem: Regret =  $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T \log m})$

$$\text{Regret}_{\text{MWUA}} = \sum_{t=1}^T \underline{l}_t \cdot \underline{p}_t - \sum_{t=1}^T l_{t,i} \leq 2 \sqrt{T \log m}$$

$$\sum_{t=1}^T l_{t,i} \geq T \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} + \gamma\right) - 2 \sqrt{T \log m} > \frac{T}{2}$$

$$= \frac{T}{2} + \underbrace{\gamma T - 2 \sqrt{T \log m}}_{\text{for sufficiently large } T}$$

For every  $i$ , a majority of the hypotheses from the set  $\{h_1, \dots, h_T\}$  correctly classify it.

$\cdot H(x) = \text{MAJ}(h_1(x), \dots, h_T(x))$  classifies all  $m$  examples correctly.

## von Neumann's Min-max Theorem :

Two person zero-sum games.



Player 1 goes first: what would player 2 do?

Player 1 picks  $i$ , Player 2 picks  $j$  that minimizes  $A_{ij}$

$$\underbrace{\max_i \min_j A_{ij}}_{\text{Payoff to player 1 if they go first}} \leq \underbrace{\min_j \max_i A_{ij}}_{\text{Payoff to player 1 if they go second.}}$$

Player 1 picks probability distribution over  $\{1, \dots, n\}$ .  $\sigma_1$   
 Player 2 " " " " " over  $\{1, \dots, m\}$ .  $\sigma_2$

$$\text{Payoff to Player 1} = \mathbb{E}_{\substack{i \sim \sigma_1 \\ j \sim \sigma_2}} A_{ij} = \sum_{i,j} (\sigma_1)_i (\sigma_2)_j A_{ij}$$

$$\max_{\sigma_1} \min_{\sigma_2} \mathbb{E}_{\substack{i \sim \sigma_1 \\ j \sim \sigma_2}} [A_{ij}] = \min_{\sigma_2} \max_{\sigma_1} \mathbb{E}_{\substack{i \sim \sigma_1 \\ j \sim \sigma_2}} [A_{ij}] \quad (\text{von Neumann's min-max})$$

Payoff instead of losses:

$$\text{Regret} = \text{Best payoff in hindsight} - \text{Payoff of online algorithm} \leq O(\sqrt{T \log n})$$

Player 1 uses MWUA to pick  $\sigma_1^t$  over  $\{1, \dots, n\}$ .

Player 2 picks a strategy that's optimal for  $\sigma_1^t$ .

$$\sigma_2^t \in \arg \min_{\substack{i \sim \sigma_1^t \\ j \sim \sigma_2^t}} \mathbb{E}_{\substack{i \sim \sigma_1^t \\ j \sim \sigma_2^t}} A_{ij}, \quad P_{t,i} = \mathbb{E}_{j \sim \sigma_2^t} A_{ij}$$

$$(i) \quad \mathbb{E}_{\substack{i \sim \sigma_1^t \\ j \sim \sigma_2^t}} A_{ij} \leq \vartheta_1.$$

$$\text{Total payoff} = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}_{\substack{i \sim \sigma_1^t \\ j \sim \sigma_2^t}} A_{ij} \leq T \vartheta_1$$

Player 2 plays  $\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \sigma_2^t$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (ii) \quad \frac{1}{T} \max_{\sigma} \sum_{t=1}^T \sigma_t \cdot P_t \\ \perp \max_{\sigma} \sigma \cdot \sum_{t=1}^T P_t \\ \Leftrightarrow \max_{\sigma} \sum_{t=1}^T \sigma_t \cdot P_t \geq T \vartheta_2 \end{array} \right.$$

$$\text{Regret} \geq T\vartheta_2 - T\vartheta_1$$
$$\text{Regret} \leq O(\sqrt{T \log n}).$$

$$\vartheta_2 - \vartheta_1 \leq 2 \sqrt{\frac{\log n}{T}} \quad \forall T.$$

$$\Rightarrow \vartheta_2 = \vartheta_1.$$

---

A.