Proof Technology for High-Assurance Runtime Systems



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Functional Languages for High-Assurance Applications

- Goal: rely on properties of functional languages to build high-assurance software in cost-effective way
 - Improved productivity through abstraction
 - Memory safety
 - Type safety

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- Formal semantics (maybe!)
- Easy reasoning about programs (maybe!)
- Especially interested in systems code
 - important, tricky
- Example: the House proof-of-concept OS [ICFP05]



A Credibility Gap

- House relies on services provided by the Glasgow Haskell Compiler (GHC) run-time system
 - currently around 35-50KLOC of complex C code
- Any assurance argument that we might make about House requires a corresponding argument about the run-time system
 - hard or impossible for existing RTS
- Situation is similar for many other high-level languages/implementations, e.g. Java



How to Bridge the Gap

- Reduce code size:
 - Eliminate functionality that we don't need
 - Eliminate accidental/historical complexity
- Re-implement in a safer language
- Re-implement with new goals
 - Simplicity
 - Ease of formal verification
- Stress formal specification of intended behavior



HARTS

High-Assurance RTS for Haskell, Java, ...

Services:

- Garbage collection
- Concurrency
- Interfacing to untrusted languages



First priority

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Talk Outline

Motivation for HARTS Verifying Garbage Collectors Verifying Imperative Pointer Programs Verifying Using Deep Embeddings, Separation Logic, and Tactics



Where Do GC Bugs Come From?

- Errors in algorithms
 - Especially for highly-concurrent algorithms
- Errors in GC implementation
- Errors in mutator
 - Mutator must identify all roots
 - Mutator must respect GC data structures

Formalizing the contract is a critical first step



Focus for Today



Principles for Verified GC

- Insist on machine-checked proofs
- Verify the actual implementation
 - Amortize the cost of verification over all uses
- Engineer a re-usable framework for future verifications of similar style
 - Amortize the cost of building the framework over multiple GCs
- Build on existing work
 - at INRIA (Leroy et al) on certified compilation
 - at Yale (Shao, McCreight, et al) on certified GCs



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Feasibility

- Very few published machine-checked proofs of GC implementations
 - [FluetWang04, McCreight++07, Hawblitzel++07, Myreen08,...?]
- Typically 100-300 lines, and somewhat simplified

Wanted: a proof methodology that will scale to GC's of this size and complexity

• There are fielded, production-quality GC implementations with good performance and support for a rich set of language features in 2000 LOC



What about types?

- Long-standing goal: define a strongly-typed language rich enough to express collectors
- Proposals to date are complex
 - and only guarantee safety
- We're following a different path, based on generalpurpose provers (e.g. Coq, Isabelle, etc.)
 - Ultimately, approaches may converge
- In any case, type-based approach may still be useful choice for verifying mutator behavior









Implemented as a pipeline with multiple stages



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Compcert Semantic Framework

- Compcert IL behavior is specified by operational semantics
 - given as Coq inductive relation
 - bad programs just get stuck; no types needed
- Evaluation yields result and trace of system calls
- Semantic preservation at each compiler transformation means
 - at program level: result and trace preserved
 - at statement level: effect of statement on state is suitably simulated

- etc.



Cheney-style GC code (1)

```
"scanPtrField" (xp,free) : int -> int -> int
#define NULL PTR 0
                                                              var x, len, hdr;
var "freep"[4]
var "toStartp"[4]
                                                              x = int32[xp];
var "toEndp"[4]
                                                              if (x == NULL PTR)
var "frStartp"[4]
                                                                return free;
var "frEndp"[4]
                                                              hdr = int32[x - 4];
                                                              if (hdr != NULL PTR) {
"numFields" (x) : int -> int
                                                                len = "numFields"(hdr) : int -> int;
{ return int32[x]; }
                                                                "memCopy"(x - 4, free, len + 1) : int \rightarrow int \rightarrow int \rightarrow void;
                                                                int32[x] = free + 4;
"fieldIsPointer" (x,k) : int -> int -> int
                                                                int32[x - 4] = NULL PTR;
{ return int32[x+4] <= k; }
                                                                free = free + 4 * \text{len} + 4;
"memCopy" (src,dst,len) : int -> int -> int -> void
                                                              int32[xp] = int32[x];
{ var i;
                                                              return free:
 i = 0:
 while (I < Ien) {
   int32[dst + 4 * i] = int32[src + 4 * i];
   i = i + 1:
```

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}

Cheney-style GC code (2)

"cheneyCollect" (rootp) : int -> int

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var hdr,len,toStart,toEnd,root,free,frStart,frEnd,scan,i,isPtr;

frStart = int32["toStartp"]; toStart = int32["frStartp"]; int32["toStartp"] = toStart; int32["frStartp"] = frStart; toEnd = int32["frEndp"]; frEnd = int32["toEndp"]; int32["toEndp"] = toEnd; int32["frEndp"] = frEnd;

```
free = "scanPtrField"(root, toStart) : int -> int;
scan = toStart;
while (scan != free) {
    hdr = int32[scan];
    scan = scan + 4;
    len = "numFields"(hdr) : int -> int;
    i = 0;
    while (I < len) {
        isPtr = "fieldIsPointer"(hdr,i) : int -> int -> int;
        if (isPtr)
            free = "scanPtrField"(scan,free) : int -> int -> int;
        scan = scan + 4;
        i = i + 1;
    }
}
```

"cheneyAlloc"(hdr,root) : int -> int -> int

var free,len;

free = int32["freep"]; len = "numFields"(hdr) : int -> int; len = len * 4; if (len == 0) return 0; if (free + len + 4 >= int32["toEndp"]) { free = "cheneyCollect"(root) : int -> int; if (free + len + 4 >= int32["toEndp"]) return 0; } int32["freep"] = free + len + 4; int32[free] = hdr; return (free + 4);

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Proving Cminor Programs

- Just a special case of general task: proving properties of imperative pointer-based programs
- A long-standing but newly lively research area
- No single generally-accepted approach
- (NB. Different from Compcert's goal, which is about proving correctness of transformations on imperative programs)



Talk Outline

Motivation for HARTS Verifying Garbage Collectors **Verifying Imperative Pointer Programs** Verifying Using Deep Embeddings, Separation Logic, and Tactics



A naïve investigation

- What's the current state of the art?
- Started examining alternatives in Fall '06
- Caveats:
 - Was on sabbatical at INRIA Rocquencourt
 - Using a theorem prover for the first time
 - National bias towards Coq-based tools
- Case-study examples initially from [Mehta&Nipkow05]
- Assume that bulk of each proof will need to be done using an interactive prover



Example: in-place list reversal

```
"reverse" (v) : int -> int {
 var w,t;
                                   V.
 w = 0;
 while (v != 0) {
                                    0
                                         b
                          W
                              ► a
                                                   С
     t = int32[v + 4];
     int32[v + 4] = w;
     W = V;
     v = t;
                                    0
                                         b
                                а
                                                   С
  }
  return w;
                                    W
}
```



Proving properties of reverse

Precondition: v points to

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```
a well-formed acyclic list with
"reverse" (v) : int \rightarrow int {
                                                   cell addresses vs = v,v2,v3, ...vn
  var w,t;
  W = 0;
                                            Loop invariant:
  while (v != 0) {
                                                •v and w point to well-formed
       t = int32[v + 4];
                                                acyclic lists vs', ws'
                                                •(rev vs') ++ ws' = rev vs
       int32[v + 4] = w;
                                                •vs' & ws' are disjoint
       W = V;
       v = t;
                         Loop termination condition:
                         length of vs decreases at each
   }
                         iteration
  return w;
                                                  Postcondition: return value points
                                                  to a well-formed acyclic list with
}
                                                  cell addresses vn,...,v2,v = rev vs
```

Not proven: contents of list don't change!

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Three Coq-based Alternatives

- Caduceus+Why -> Coq
- Monadic shallow embedding + extraction
- Deep embedding + separation logic + tactics



Caduceus+Why [Filliatre+]

- Verification Condition (VC) generation from annotated imperative programs (C,Java,...)
 - function pre- and post- conditions
 - loop invariants, "variants" (termination measures)
 - assertions
- Targets many backend provers
 - both fully automated (Ergo,...) and proof assistants (Coq,...)
- No mechanized proof that VC extraction is correct



Example: specifying 'reverse'

- I'll skip the actual specification notation...
- By the time we've translated to Coq, our notion of a well-formed pointer list amounts to this:

Note that the store is quite explicit



Invariant for 'reverse'

- Here's a suitable loop invariant:
 Definition rev_inv (s:Sto) (v:Ptr) (vs: list Ptr) (w:Ptr) (ws: list Ptr) (xs: list Ptr) :=

 Plist s v vs /\ Plist s w ws /\ disjoint vs ws /\ rev vs ++ ws = rev xs.
- We must maintain explicit disjointness information in rev_inv, and via lemmas like this:

```
Lemma List_NoDup: forall s x xs,
List s x xs -> NoDup xs.
```

 Can also use Bornat-style field-separation axioms



Example 'reverse' VC

 Here's the VC corresponding to maintenance of the loop invariant and "variant"

```
Lemma loop_ok :

forall s0 v0 vs0, Plist s0 v0 vs0 ->

forall s v vs w ws,

rev_inv s v vs w ws vs0 ->

v <> null ->

forall v', v' = load s (next v) ->

forall s', s' = update s (next v) w ->

rev_inv s' v' (tail vs) v (v::ws) vs0 /\

length s' v' < length s v.
```

 Note that imperative operations on local variables are all gone



Assessment of Caduceus

- + Function and loop specs are (mostly) natural
- + Termination handling is separable -- very nice
- + Proof size reasonable (~ 138 lines for reverse)
- Coq translations of specs and VC's are much uglier than I've shown
- Very hard to connect VC's mentally to code positions/paths
- VC's can be huge and repetitive
 - e.g. 25 line in-place merge algorithm from [Mehta&Nipkow05] generated 6900 lines of VC's!

Many of these problems are "just" engineering issues

- + team is working on them
- but their focus is on fully automated paths



Three Coq-based Alternatives

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Coq proofs for Coq functions

- The easiest subject for a Coq proof is a Coq program
 - i.e., a function written in the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC) itself
- Can then use Coq's extraction facility to get corresponding executable code in OCaml, etc.
 - Same properties should hold
 - Remaining proof obligation: extraction is correct...
- But CIC programs must be pure (and "obviously" terminating) and can be higher-order...



Monadic Shallow Embeddings

How can we adopt this approach to imperative pointer code?

- Answer : Code programs using an abstract state monad! (And keep code first-order)
- This gives a **shallow embedding**: our imperative program is represented by its denotation in CIC.
- Must adjust extraction to get imperative operations instead of monadic encoding...
- ... or connect to imperative code another way



Defining the Store Monad

Definition Sto := Loc -> Val.
Definition update (s:Sto) (l:Loc) (v:Val) : Sto :=
fun IO => if eq_loc_dec I IO then v else s IO.

Definition M (A:Set) := Sto -> Sto*A.
Definition Return (A:Set) (e:A) : M A := fun s => (s,e).
Definition Bind (A B:Set) (m : M A) (k : A -> M B) : M B :=
fun s => let (s',a) = m s in k a s'.

Definition Put (I:Loc) (v:Val): M unit := fun s => (update s | v,u). Definition Get (I:Loc) : M Val := fun s => (s,s |).

Definition run (A:Set) (s:Sto) (m: M A) : Sto*A := m s.



Monadic CIC example: 'reverse'



Definition revinplace (v : Loc) : M Loc := rev1 v 0.

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Specs & proof for 'reverse'

- Specification is essentially similar to Caduceus style
- Proof (~ 80 lines) is also similar in substance, but code appears explicitly in hypotheses
 - We can "step through" it if we wish
- Proof "opens up" monadic abstraction, making heap state explicit
- Code is already functional, so no mutable local variables to worry about



What about Termination?

- All CIC functions must be "obviously" terminating
- So as written just now, rev1 wasn't valid Coq
- Recent Coq extensions use dependent types to allow termination obligations to be treated separately
 - Can get partial correctness by just admitting obligation
 - Proof terms can get messy: dependent types don't mix well with monadic abstraction
- Alternatively, we can add a decreasing measure as extra, artificial argument


Larger example: mark&sweep GC

Extremely simple heap model:

two-word cons cells, each with one-word header (containing marked flag)

all reachable cell contents are valid pointers (possibly null) -- no other values!

Extremely simple collector:

single free list, linked through left children assume unbounded recursion stack, but...

To keep Coq happy, recursive mark routine has an extra depth parameter that bounds traversal (could be used to index an explicit mark stack)



Proofs for mark&sweep

- We specify and prove a strong correctness result for the collector
 - includes both safety and progress results
- Proof is ~ 2100 lines
- Side note: bounded marking has a much more complicated invariant than unbounded marking!
- Not a very realistic collector
 - No headers (beause fixed size, everything is a pointer)
 - Heap addresses are modeled as natural numbers



Imperative Code Extraction

- Can hack a post-processor for existing Coq extraction mechanism that converts explicitly monadic code to implicitly monadic code.
- Cleaner approach: get Coq team to support extraction to imperative languages directly
- But is the extraction process itself trustworthy anyhow?
 - There is a pencil&paper proof...
 - ...and ongoing work to formalize this within Coq
- Basic idea: model the extraction target language within Coq using ASTs and an operational semantics
 - a deep embedding
 - prove shallow and deep embeddings are equivalent



Monadic CIC Assessment

- + Flexible proof organization & style
- + Good integration of programs and proofs
- + Pleasant (functional!) coding style
- Termination is a persistent problem
- Don't know how to mix monads with proof techniques based on dependent types
- Need a lot more engineering to automate and verify connection between CIC and imperative code



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Just use Deep Embeddings?

McCreight, Shao et al. (working at Yale) have produced impressive GC proofs on a deeplyembedded MIPS-like machine code

- Appel & Blazy (working at INRIA) have suggested doing program proofs directly on a deep embedding of CMinor
- Proofs require a **program logic** describing the target language's behavior

These authors also use separation logic

- avoid need for much explicit separation reasoning in proofs
- Strong need for specialized **tactics** to work with these encoded logics



Initial Assessment : Mixed

- +++ Proofs apply directly to the imperative program representation (and to Compcert certified compiler chain)
- --- Working directly with the semantic evaluation relation is hard!
 - Yale work took many graduate-student-years
 - Specialized tactics seem essential
 - But tactics are hard to develop and maintain (e.g. Appel&Blazy's don't quite work yet)...
 - ...and they are fragile, leaving you at the mercy of the expert tactic author!



Three Coq-based Alternatives

- Caduceus+Why -> Coq
- Monadic shallow embedding + extraction
- Deep embedding + separation logic + tactics
 Overall assessment:
 - All have promise
 - None quite works
 - Not clear which is best bet

But we had to move forward somehow...



Talk Outline

Motivation for HARTS Verifying Garbage Collectors Verifying Imperative Pointer Programs Verifying Using Deep Embeddings, Separation Logic, and Tactics



HARTS project approach

- Hired Andrew McCreight!
- Using a deep embedding of Cminor
- Using separation logic
- Building a substantial tactic framework
- Have already used it to prove a Cheneystyle collector
 - Fairly realistic features
 - -especially: true machine arithmetic
 - Fairly high level of automation



Framework Overview



Everything is implemented in the Coq proof assistant



Separation Logic

- Logic for reasoning about heaps [Reynolds, O'Hearn]
- Key predicates:
- P*Q Heap is split into two disjoint parts
 P holds on one part, Q on the other
- $x \mapsto v$ Holds on a heap containing only address x that contains value v
- Neatly encapsulates complexities of reasoning about pointer-based programming (aliasing, etc.)



Example: Linked Lists

Relating list values to in-memory representation:

```
Inductive Plist : val -> list val -> mem -> Prop :=
  | Plist_nil : Plist null_ptr nil m
  | Plist_cons : forall x xs t m,
     (lexists v, x ↦ v * ((x+4) ↦ t) * Plist t xs) m ->
     Plist x (x::xs) m.
```

 Separating conjunction enforces that elements are disjoint (and hence lists are acyclic)



Separation Logic Tactics

• Simplification: sle/sli

→ (B * D * true) m

Re-arrangement: assocPerm [3, [4, 1], 2]
 (A¹ * B²* C³* D⁴) m →

$$(C_3^* (D_4^* A_1) * B_2) m$$

• Matching:

Hypothesis: (A * B * C * D) mGoal: (B * C * A * D) m

searchMatch solves this immediately



Program Logic

- Hoare-style reasoning using pre- and postconditions
 - Similar to program logic of [Appel&Blazy07]
- Verified verification condition generation
 - Generator calculates a VC for each statement
 - Generated VC proven consistent with original operational semantics



Verification Conditions

precondition of next statement

- Example: vc (x := e) Q s = $\exists v. e \xrightarrow{s} v$ $\land Q(s{x:=v})$
- Extra predicate arguments are added for return, call, and jump
- Infrastructure provides tools for helping to prove VCs automatically



VC Proof Tactics

- Automatically analyze the VC
 - Break down a complex expression into substeps
 - Look for hypothesis to solve a single step
 - e.g. if loading from x, do we know what x contains?
 - Often need to manually transform a hypothesis
 - e.g. to apply elimination rules for data structures like Plist
- Branch splitting
 - Analyze the result of the branch
 - e.g. if test is (x >=4), then in true branch we know x is defined and x ≥ 4



Proof Example: List Reverse

Lemma reverseOk : fdefOk reversePre reversePost reverseDef.



```
Loop Invariant:

Definition inv is (s:cstate) :=

exists w, exists v,

(vfEqv (xv :: xw :: xt :: nil) ((xw,w) :: (xv, v) :: nil) (cvfOf s) /\

(lexists vl, lexists wl,

plist v vl * plist w wl * !(rev vl ++ wl = rev is)) (cmemOf s)).
```



Proof Details:

DEMO!!

- Main proof: ~ 45 lines
- Similar length and complexity as for our proof of the same result using shallow embedding
- Program logic and Separation logic
 tactics make this possible.

Lemma reverseOk : fdefOk P0 reverseTy reversePre reversePost reverseDef.

Proof. fdefBegin. unfold reversePre. intros is args m sp Hp. sle Hp. subst args. split. reflexivity. intros vf VFE. simpl in VFE. vcSteps.

exists (inv is). split.

(* establish loop invariant *)
unfold inv.
exists null_ptr. exists x. split; auto.
exists is. exists (@nil val).
simpl. sli.
auto with datatypes.

(* loop entry *)
clear VFE Hp.
intros. destruct s'. destruct H as [w [v0 [VFE Hp]]].
vcSteps.
branchStep.

(* true branch: establish postcondition *) sli. unfold reversePost. subst v0. sle Hp. srewrite plist_null in Hp. sle Hp. subst x0. simpl in H. subst x1. apply Hp. (* false case: do loop body *) sle Hp. srewrite plist_non_null in Hp; [sle Hp | auto]. vcSteps. (* bottom of loop body: re-establish invariant *) rewrite H0 in H; simpl in H; rewrite app ass in H; simpl in H. unfold inv. exists v0. exists x3. split. vfEqvSolver. exists (tail x0). exists (v0::x1). simpl; sli. searchMatch. (* undefined case : impossible *)

subst v0; sle Hp.
srewrite plist_not_undef in Hp. sle Hp. auto.
Oed.



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Infrastructure Line Counts





Cheney-style GC Proof Spec

Lemma cheneyCollectorOk : fdefOk cheneyCollectorPre cheneyCollectorPost cheneyCollectorDef.





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GC Achievements to Date

- We've proved correctness of a realistic GC implementation written in Cminor
- Advances on our (McCreight's) previous work:
 - Uses true machine arithmetic
 - Supports arbitrary record sizes
 - Supports precise pointer information
- Next steps: Must ensure that mutator keeps to its part of the GC contract ...
- Next steps: Proof of generational collector



Conclusions

- Assurance of programs written in high-level languages requires assurance of underlying run-time systems
- Tools and techniques for reasoning about run-time system code are still young and little tested
- Results described today:
 - A verified implementation of realistic GC
 - A general verification infrastructure for GCs and other code that manipulates the heap
 - Essential use of tactics to automate reasoning
- An enabling step towards the use of high-level languages for high-assurance applications.

