Elias Koutsoupias
Professor of Computer Science
University of Oxford
Department of Computer Science University of Oxford Wolfson Building, Parks Road Oxford, OX1 3QD, UK Office: 368 Tel: +44 (0) 1865 610738 Email: eliας@cs.ox.ac.uk 

Short Biography
I am a professor of computer science at the University of Oxford.
My research interests include algorithmic aspects of game theory, economics and networks, online algorithms, decisionmaking under uncertainty, design and analysis of algorithms, computational complexity. I received the Gödel Prize of theoretical computer science in 2012 for my work on the price of anarchy, in reference to laying the foundations of algorithmic game theory. I am also the recipient of the ERC Advanced Grant “Algorithms, Games, Mechanisms, and the Price of Anarchy”.
I previously held faculty positions at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and the University of Athens. I studied at the National Technical University of Athens (B.S. in electrical engineering) and the University of California, San Diego (Ph.D. in computer science).
Teaching
 Probability and Computing, Hilary Term 201617
 Probability and Computing, Hilary Term 201718
Research interests
Here are some of my papers. An almost complete list can be found at DBLP and at Google Scholar.
Optimal auctions
Some of my recent research focuses on designing auctions that extract optimal profit in Bayesian settings. At the heart of it is a duality framework with partial differential inequalities, which is useful for suggesting an optimal auction and for proving its optimality.
 Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions (with Yiannis Giannakopoulos)
 Selling Two Goods Optimally (with Yiannis Giannakopoulos)
 The FedEx problem (with Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, and Anna Karlin)
Gametheoretic issues of blockchain / bitcoin
Bitcoin and blockchain raise some challenging gametheoretic questions. My work is about equilibria of mining games.
 Blockchain Mining Games (with Aggelos Kiayias, Maria Kyropoulou, and Yiannis Tselekounis)
Mechanism design
Some of my work improves the bounds of mechanisms for the unrelated machines scheduling problem (NisanRonen problem)
 A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms (with George Christodoulou and Angelina Vidali)
 A lower bound of 1+φ for truthful scheduling mechanisms (with Angelina Vidali)
 Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines (with George Christodoulou and Annamaria Kovaks)
 Sceduling Without Payments
Price of anarchy
The concept of the price of anarchy appeared in a joint paper with Christos Papadimitriou in 1999:
 Worstcase equilibria (with Christos Papadimitriou)
The following papers contain some followup work on the price of anarchy of finite congestion games:
 The price of anarchy of finite congestion games (with George Christodoulou)
 On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games (with George Christodoulou)
 On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games (with George Christodoulou and Paul Spirakis)
Coordination mechanisms is one way to try to redesign systems to improve their price of anarchy:
 Coordination mechanisms (with George Christodoulou and Akash Nanavati)
Online algorithms
A large part of my research is about online algorithms.
The following is a review article on the kserver problem:
An interesting variant of the kserver problem involves infinitely many servers:
 The Infinite Server Problem (with Christian Coester and Philip Lazos)
Another challenging problem is the carpool fairness problem:
 Carpooling in social networks (with Amos Fiat, Anna Karlin, Claire Mathieu, and Rotem Zach)
Combining markets and online algorithms:
 Online Market Intermediation (with Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Philip Lazos)