Promoting Market Failure: Fighting Crime with Asymmetric Information
- 14:00 16th October 2015 ( week 1, Michaelmas Term 2015 )Tony Hoare Room, Robert Hooke Building
Economists spend a lot of time studying how the market might fail, and how government intervention might restore efficient outcomes. However there are some markets governments would prefer did not exist at all - illicit markets. Economic study of the optimum combination of detection and punishment to deter crime has been undertaken before. An additional tool examined here might be termed disruption, with the aim of encouraging market failure in illicit markets.
Speaker bio
Biography Andrew previously studied PPE at St. Catherine's College and stayed on to do his MPhil in Economics. After the MPhil he went to work as an Economics Consultant in London for a couple of years before returning to do a DPhil at Nuffield College. He joined Corpus as the Andrew Glyn CDF in October 2012.Research Andrew's research concentrates on the economics of reputation, with specific applications in illicit markets. Andrew has used existing economic models of reputation to analyze how various illicit markets are able to function in the absence of any legal mechanism to enforce agreements from drug markets to the online markets for stolen bank and credit card details. Andrew has also pursued more theoretical work on the economic nature of reputation itself. In this stream of work, he constructs a new way of modelling reputation which naturally leads to intuitive cycles in reputations, something more traditional models have difficulty producing.
Teaching Andrew teaches introductory courses in both micro and macro economics as well as more advanced courses in microeconomics. He also gives lectures on maths for undergraduates wishing to strengthen their mathematical skills.
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