Distance-Bounding Protocols: Verification without Time and Location
Sjouke Mauw ( CSC/SnT, University of Luxembourg )
- 15:00 8th May 2018 ( week 3, Trinity Term 2018 )Wolfson Building room 379
Distance-bounding protocols are cryptographic protocols that securely establish an upper bound on the physical distance between the participants. Existing formal verification models for distance-bounding protocols consider timestamps and the location of agents. In this presentation I will introduce a causality-based characterization of secure distance-bounding, which discards the notions of time and location. This allows us to verify the correctness of distance-bounding protocols with standard protocol verification tools.
Speaker bio
Sjouke Mauw is professor in security and trust of software systems at the University of Luxembourg. His current research focuses on the application of formal methods in the area of information security.Share this:
