Skip to main content

Voting with Restricted Preferences

Edith Elkind ( University of Oxford )

 

Arrow's famous impossibility theorem (1951) states that there is no
perfect voting rule: for three or more candidates, no voting rule can
satisfy a small set of very appealing axioms. However, this is no
longer the case if we assume that voters' preferences satisfy certain
restrictions, such as being single-peaked or single-crossing. In this
talk, we introduce several restricted preference domains and discuss
their properties and associated algorithmic questions. In particular,
we will present efficient algorithms for detecting whether a given
election belongs to one of these domains and for selecting the best
committee (a set of winners) for elections in these domains. No
background in social choice theory is required.

 

Speaker bio

Edith Elkind is a University Lecturer in the Department of Computer Science since October 2013. She obtained an MA (Maths) from Moscow State University and a PhD from Princeton (CompSci) in 2005. Before coming to Oxford, she was a postdoctoral fellow at University of Warwick, University of Liverpool, and Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and held faculty positions at University of Southampton and Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). Her research interests are in the areas of algorithmic game theory and computational social choice. She holds editorial positions at Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (JAAMAS), Journal of AI Research (JAIR), Artificial Intelligence Journal (AIJ), and ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC); two of her papers with her PhD students received best student paper awards at the AAMAS conference.

Share this: