Decentralized defence in networks
- 14:00 4th February 2014 ( week 3, Hilary Term 2014 )Lecture Theatre B
We study the problem of a planner who chooses a network of connections between node-players prior to the decentralized Defender-Adversary game. After the links are chosen, the nodes choose simultaneously whether to protect or not after which the adversary infects one of the nodes and the infection spreads. The objective of the designer is to maximize social welfare while the nodes derive utility from the number of nodes they can access in the residual network, minus the cost of protection.
We study the price of stability and the price of anarchy of the whole game and show that both are equal and bounded from above by a constant. We also look at the problem with attack being random.
Joint work with Diego Cerdeiro and Sanjeev Goyal (University of Cambridge).
Speaker bio
Marcin Dziubiński is an assistant professor at the Insitute of Informatics, University of Warsaw. He received PhD in economics from University of Lancaster, where he worked on location games and he received PhD in computer science from University of Warsaw, where he worked on computational complexity of modal formalisms for multi-agent systems. In years 2011-12 he was a postdoc at the University of Cambridge where he worked for Era-Net on Complexity project RESINEE: Resilience and Interaction of Networks in Ecology and Economics. His current research interests focus on strategic resilience of networks.Share this:
