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Optimal Auctions from Combinatorial Optimization

Constantinos Daskalakis ( MIT, USA )

In his seminal paper, Myerson [1981] provided a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to multiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple items in an auction has been a central problem in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient, using a combinatorial optimization approach.

(Joint work with Yang Cai and Matt Weinberg. The talk will assume no prior knowledge of auction theory.)

Speaker bio

Constantinos Daskalakis is the x-window consortium associate professor of computer science at MIT. He holds a diploma in electrical and computer engineering from the National Technical University of Athens, and a Ph.D. in electrical engineering and computer sciences from UC-Berkeley. His research interests lie in theoretical computer science and applied probability with a focus on the computational aspects of the Internet, online markets and social networks. Daskalakis has been honored with the 2007 Microsoft Graduate Research Fellowship, the 2008 ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award, the Game Theory and Computer Science Prize from the Game Theory Society, the 2010 Sloan Fellowship in Computer Science, the 2011 SIAM Outstanding Paper Prize, the 2011 Ruth and Joel Spira Award for Distinguished Teaching, and the 2012 Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship.

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