Accepted Papers

  • Tamas Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Akihisa Tamura and Alexander Teytelboym.
    Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts

  • Zhentao Li and Adrian Vetta.
    The Fair Division of Hereditary Set Systems

  • Paul Goldberg and Francisco Javier Marmolejo Cossio.
    Learning Convex Partitions and Computing Game-theoretic Equilibria from Best Response Queries

  • Elliot Anshelevich and Wennan Zhu.
    Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility Location Problems given Candidate Positions

  • Kitty Meeks and Baharak Rastegari.
    Stable Marriage with Groups of Similar Agents

  • Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong.
    Pricing Multi-Unit Markets

  • Amir Ban.
    Strategy-Proof Incentives for Predictions

  • Evdokia Nikolova, Ger Yang and Emmanouil Pountourakis.
    Optimal Mechanism Design with Risk-loving Agents

  • Tami Tamir.
    Cost-Sharing Games in Real-Time Scheduling Systems

  • Chi-Jen Lu.
    The Communication Complexity of Graphical Games on Grid Graphs

  • Robert Scheffler, Martin Strehler and Laura Vargas Koch.
    Equilibria in routing games with edge priorities

  • Darya Melnyk, Yuyi Wang and Roger Wattenhofer.
    Byzantine Preferential Voting

  • Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jieming Mao, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Christos Tzamos.
    Combinatorial Assortment Optimization

  • Christian Saile and Warut Suksompong.
    Robust Bounds on Choosing from Large Tournaments

  • Meena Jagadeesan and Alexander Wei.
    Varying the Number of Signals in Matching Markets

  • Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin, Kamesh Munagala and Kangning Wang.
    A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer

  • Shuchi Chawla, Seffi Naor, Debmalya Panigrahi, Mohit Singh and Seeun William Umboh.
    Timing Matters: Online Dynamics in Broadcast Games

  • Nikhil Garg, Ashish Goel and Benjamin Plaut.
    Markets for Public Decision-making

  • Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Keyu Zhu.
    Optimal Pricing For MHR Distributions

  • Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Eric Sodomka and Nicolas Stier-Moses.
    Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets

  • Paul Gölz, Anson Kahng, Simon Mackenzie and Ariel D. Procaccia.
    The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy

  • Moshe Babaioff and Sigal Oren.
    Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Models

  • Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Themistoklis Melissourgos and Paul Spirakis.
    Approximating the Existential Theory of the Reals

  • Vijay Menon and Kate Larson.
    Robust and Approximately Stable Marriages under Partial Information

  • Pooya Jalaly and Eva Tardos.
    Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations

  • Vasilis Kontonis, Dimitris Fotakis, Stratis Skoulakis and Vardis Kandiros.
    Opinion Dynamics with Limited Information

  • Chamsi Hssaine and Siddhartha Banerjee.
    Information Signal Design for Incentivizing Team Formation

  • Shant Boodaghians.
    Revealed Preference Dimension via Matrix Sign Rank

  • Vijay Kamble.
    Revenue Management on an On-Demand Service Platform

  • Mohit Hota and Sanjiv Kapoor.
    Equilibrium and Inefficiency in Multi-Product Cournot Games

  • Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi and Ali Shameli.
    Prophet Inequalities vs. Approximating Optimum Online

  • Hannah Li, Anilesh Krishnaswamy, Vijay Kamble and Ramesh Johari.
    Exploration vs. Exploitation in Team Formation for Collaborative Work

  • Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy and Ashish Goel.
    Implementing the Lexicographic Maxmin Bargaining Solution

  • Ziwei Ji, Ruta Mehta and Matus Telgarsky.
    Social welfare and profit maximization from revealed preferences

  • Guy Avni, Thomas Henzinger and Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen.
    Infinite-Duration Poorman-Bidding Games

  • Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta and Marcin Dziubiński.
    How to hide in a network?