Conference Program

(details not quite finalised; please revisit later)

Contributed talks are 22.5 minutes (20 minutes for talk + 2.5 for questions). The Best Paper presentation receives an additional 10 minutes.

Friday, December 14th  (go to Dec. 15, Dec. 16, Dec. 17)
17:00-19:00 Registration
18:00-19:30 Pre-dinner Drinks Reception
19:30-21:00 Dinner
Saturday, December 15th
8:00-9:00 Breakfast
8:30-9:00 Registration
8:55-9:00 Welcome, Opening Remarks
Chair: P. Goldberg
Plenary Talk: Noam Nisan
Pricing Complexity
10:00-10:10 Short Break
Mechanism Design and Auctions

Chair: G. Christodoulou
Cheng, Gravin, Munagala, Wang
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer
Jalaly, Tardos
Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations
11:05-11:30 Coffee Break
Routing and Cost Sharing

Chair: I. Giannakopoulos
Scheffler, Strehler, Vargas Koch
Equilibria in Routing Games with Edge Priorities
Babaioff, Oren
Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Models
Cost-Sharing Games in Real-Time Scheduling Systems
Chawla, Naor, Panigrahi, Singh, Umboh
Timing Matters: Online Dynamics in Broadcast Games
13:00-14:00 Lunch
Computing Equilibria and Complexity

Chair: S. Oren
Chou, Lu
The Communication Complexity of Graphical Games on Grid Graphs
Goldberg, Marmolejo-Cossío
Learning Convex Partitions and Computing Game-Theoretic Equilibria from Best Response Queries
Hota, Kapoor
Equilibrium and Inefficiency in Multi-Product Cournot Games
Avni, Henzinger, Ibsen-Jensen
Infinite-Duration Poorman-Bidding Games
15:30-15:50 Tea Break

Chair: M. Polukarov
Gölz, Kahng, Mackenzie, Procaccia
The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy
Melnyk, Wang, Wattenhofer
Byzantine Preferential Voting
Garg, Goel, Plaut
Markets for Public Decision-Making
17:00-19:00 Poster Board Session
19:30-21:00 Dinner
Sunday, December 16th
8:00-9:00 Breakfast
Chair: G. Christodoulou
Plenary Talk: Anna Karlin
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations
10:00-10:15 Short Break
Auctions and Markets

Chair: M. Hoefer
Conitzer, Kroer, Sodomka, Stier-Moses
Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets
Immorlica, Lucier, Mao, Syrgkanis, Tzamos
Combinatorial Assortment Optimization
11:00-11:30 Coffee Break
Pricing and Revenue Management

Chair: N. Gravin
Ezra, Feldman, Roughgarden, Suksompong
Pricing Multi-Unit Markets
Giannakopoulos, Zhu
Optimal Pricing for MHR Distributions
Revenue Management on an On-Demand Service Platform
Niazedeh, Saberi, Shameli
Prophet Inequalities vs. Approximating Optimum Online
13:00-14:30 Lunch
Chair: P. Goldberg
Plenary Talk: Paul Klemperer
Art of Designing Practical Multi-Product Auctions
15:30-16:00 Tea Break
Social Choice and Matching

Chair: A. Filos-Ratsikas
Anshelevich, Zhu
Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility-Location Problems given Candidate Positions
Menon, Larson
Robust and Approximately Stable Marriages under Partial Information
Meeks, Rastegari
Stable Marriage with Groups of Similar Agents
Deligkas, Fearnley, Melissourgos, Spirakis
Approximating the Existential Theory of the Reals
17:45-19:00 Business Meeting
Location: Mary Ogilvie LT
19:30-21:00 Conference Dinner
Monday, December 17th
8:00-9:00 Breakfast
Chair: T. Harks
Plenary Talk: Stefano Leonardi
Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Two-Sided Markets
10:00-10:15 Short Break
Network Games

Chair: T. Harks
Bloch, Dutta, Dziubiński
How to Hide in a Network
Kontonis, Fotakis, Skoulakis, Kandiros
Opinion Dynamics with Limited Information
11:00-11:30 Coffee Break
Mechanism Design and Trading Networks

Chair: D. Fotakis
Nikolova, Yang, Pountourakis
Optimal Mechanism Design with Risk-Loving Agents
Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, Teytelboym
Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts
Li, Vetta
The Fair Division of Hereditary Set Systems
Jagadeesan, Wei
Varying the Number of Signals in Matching Markets
13:00-14:00 Lunch
Incentives and Bargaining

Chair: G. Piliouras
Strategy-Proof Incentives for Predictions
Hssaine, Banerjee
Information Signal Design for Incentivizing Team Formation
Li, Kollagunta Krishnaswamy, Kamble, Johari
Exploration vs. Exploitation in Team Formation
Kollagunta Krishnaswamy, Goel
Implementing the Lexicographic Maxmin Bargaining Solution
15:30-16:00 Tea Break
Voting and Social Choice

Chair: M. Brill
Saile, Suksompong
Robust Bounds on Choosing from Large Tournaments
Ji, Mehta, Telgarski
Social Welfare and Profit Maximization from Revealed Preferences
Revealed Preference Dimension via Matrix Sign Rank
                                    End of Conference